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INTRODUCTION 
Fourteen years ago, the Tennessee Supreme Court wisely held that 
the made-whole doctrine applied to subrogation interests in personal injury 
and wrongful death settlements and judgments.1 Subsequent decisions have 
consistently recognized and firmly established that both subrogation and the 
made-whole doctrine are rooted in equity. 
To date, however, the Court has not been presented with the 
opportunity to decide a case that involves an interaction of the law of 
comparative fault, subrogation, and the made-whole doctrine. The 
resolution of the individual issues that arise in this context and that will 
eventually be presented to the Court should be done within a framework 
that recognizes and respects the equitable nature of subrogation and the 
made-whole doctrine while giving fair, reasonably predictable treatment to 
tort defendants, tort plaintiffs, and those holding subrogation interests. 
This Article attempts to meet these goals by proposing the adoption 
of the “Modified Made-Whole Doctrine Proposal” (hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as the “Proposal”). Part I begins by explaining the roots of the 
law of subrogation rights and its current jurisprudential inconsistencies. It 
also explores the relationship between such subrogation rights and the 
made-whole doctrine in the context of Tennessee tort law as well as how 
this doctrine would be applied in Tennessee today. Next, Part II briefly 
outlines some of the general questions regarding Tennessee’s current 
application of the made-whole doctrine, particularly the unresolved issues 
surrounding the impact of comparative fault on subrogation rights. These 
are questions which the author’s suggested Proposal is designed to directly 
address. The detailed framework of this Proposal, including its five 
fundamental Principles and their underpinning rules, are set forth at length 
in Part III. Finally, Part IV concludes by analyzing the practical application 
of this Proposal throughout the various stages of the litigation process and 
offers guidance to judges, attorneys, and litigants alike as to how such 
subrogation disputes can be equitably resolved. In sum, the Modified Made-
Whole Doctrine Proposal is meant to provide for the efficient, just 
                                                 
 1. York v. Sevier Cnty. Ambulance Auth., 8 S.W.3d 616 (Tenn. 1999); Blankenship 
v. Estate of Bain, 5 S.W.3d 647 (Tenn. 1999). 
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application of the made-whole doctrine to subrogation interests with respect 
to Tennessee’s law of comparative fault. To better comprehend how this 
should be achieved, it is necessary to first look at the fundamentals of both 
subrogation and the made-whole doctrine. 
PART I. SUBROGATION RIGHTS AND THE MADE-WHOLE DOCTRINE 
A. Subrogation 
Subrogation simply means the “substitution of one person for 
another.”2 In the context of insurance policies, where it most frequently 
arises, subrogation allows the insurer3 to “stand in the shoes” of its insured 
to assert the insured’s rights against a tort defendant who caused harm to 
the insured for which the insurer has paid a covered loss.4 In essence, the 
insurer’s payment becomes the tort defendant’s debt to the insurer; as a 
result, the insurer is entitled to all the rights and remedies that its insured 
would otherwise have.5 
Subrogation is grounded in equity.6 Its rationale is based on 
furthering principles of indemnification by requiring the party responsible 
for a debt to pay it, and on preventing unjust enrichment by precluding an 
insured from recovering twice for the same injury.7 Subrogation also serves 
to assure that a wrongdoer who is legally responsible for the harm does not 
receive the windfall of being absolved from liability merely because the 
insured received insurance proceeds.8 In practice, however, subrogation 
principally entails an equitable adjustment of rights between the insured and 
the insurer.9 
Despite its equitable roots, a subrogation right is often classified as 
legal, conventional, or statutory.10 Legal subrogation arises by operation of 
                                                 
 2. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3, at 404 (2d ed. 1993). 
 3. An insurer asserting a right of subrogation is a “subrogee,” and its insured is a 
“subrogor.” To avoid confusion and enhance readability, however, the Article will primarily 
use the paired terms “subrogee” and “insured” to refer to the relevant parties. 
 4. DOBBS, supra note 2; see also Wimberly v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 584 
S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tenn. 1979); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1563–64 (9th ed. 2009). 
 5. DOBBS, supra note 2; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4. 
 6. Wimberly, 584 S.W.2d at 203 (“The doctrine of subrogation in insurance does not 
arise from, nor is it dependent upon, statute or custom or any of the terms of the contract; it 
has its origin in general principles of equity and in the nature of the insurance contract as one 
of indemnity. The right of subrogation rests not upon a contract, but upon the principles of 
natural justice.”). 
 7. See Castleman Constr. Co. v. Pennington, 432 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Tenn. 1968); 
Johnny C. Parker, The Made Whole Doctrine: Unraveling the Enigma Wrapped in the 
Mystery of Insurance Subrogation, 70 MO. L. REV. 723, 725–26 (2005). 
 8. 16 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 222:8, at 222:31–32 (Lee R. Russ 
& Thomas F. Segalli eds., 3d ed. 2005). 
 9. Parker, supra note 7, at 725–26. 
 10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 1564; Blankenship v. Estate of Bain, 5 
S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1999). 
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law or by implication in equity, and so it may sometimes be referred to as 
judicial or equitable subrogation.11 Conventional,12 or contractual, 
subrogation “arises by contract or by an express act of the parties.”13 
Statutory subrogation arises from legislation that grants a person, entity, or 
organization a right of subrogation.14 
However, this distinction based on the source of a subrogation right 
is not always controlling with regard to its legal effect in a given 
jurisdiction.15 For example, courts in many jurisdictions consider 
subrogation rights arising in contract as against public policy or as subject 
to limitation by traditional equitable principles. Tennessee is one such 
jurisdiction: subrogation rights are defined by statute in certain 
circumstances,16 but subrogation rights arising from insurance contracts are 
subordinate to the made-whole doctrine.17 
Thus, the inconsistencies in subrogation jurisprudence across 
jurisdictions may be better understood as a fundamental theoretical rift 
representing two antithetical approaches to the doctrine. The first approach, 
referred to here as the “traditional rule,” adheres to subrogation’s 
conceptual origins in equity18 and takes the view that contractual 
subrogation rights are not absolute, but instead limited by common law 
equitable principles such as the made-whole doctrine.19 This approach is 
                                                 
 11. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 1564. 
 12. The term conventional is somewhat of a misnomer given the historical origins of 
the doctrine in equity. However, one might argue that a shift favoring contractual 
subrogation is the trend in the law. See infra note 27 & accompanying text. For the sake of 
clarity, this Article will use the term “contractual subrogation.” 
 13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4 at 1564; Blankenship, 5 S.W.3d at 650. 
 14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4 at 1564; Blankenship, 5 S.W.3d at 650. 
 15. Parker, supra note 7, at 727–28; see also Wimberly v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, 
Pa., 584 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tenn. 1979) (stating that the distinction between legal and 
conventional subrogation is only dispositive of “whether there is a right of subrogation in the 
first instance, rather than in the enforcement of such right.”); Castleman Constr. Co. v. 
Pennington, 432 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Tenn. 1968) (holding that equitable considerations 
determine whether a subrogation right is enforceable regardless of the source of the right). 
 16. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-112(c) (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-117 
(2002). 
 17. See, e.g., York v. Sevier Cnty. Ambulance Auth., 8 S.W.3d 616 (Tenn. 1999) 
(“[O]ur case law is clear that an insurer is not entitled to subrogation unless and until the 
insured has been made whole for his or her losses, regardless of what language is contained 
in the contract.”). 
 18. For a thorough discussion of subrogation’s origins in equity, see Brendan S. Maher 
& Radha A. Pathak, Understanding and Problematizing Contractual Tort Subrogation, 40 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 49, 59–72 (2008). 
 19. Historically at common law the notion that rights of subrogation were subject to 
the made-whole doctrine was widely accepted. See e.g., Atherton v. Tesch, 80 So. 832, 832–
33 (Ala. 1919) (explaining that “[i]t is a well-settled general rule that before subrogation can 
be enforced the whole debt must be paid,” and collecting authorities, to wit: J.P. Browder & 
Co. v. Hill, 136 F. 821 (6th Cir. 1905); Wilkins v. Gibson, 38 S.E. 374 (Ga. 1901); Hubbard 
v. Le Barron, 81 N.W. 681 (Iowa 1900); Gaskill v. Huffaker, 49 S.W. 770 (Ky. 1899); 
London & Nw. Am. Mortg. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 56 N.W. 464 (Minn. 1893); Wyckoff v. 
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most often justified by pointing out that the insured loss was a risk that the 
insurer was paid to assume, and had the tortfeasor been judgment-proof and 
uninsured, the insurer would still have had to bear the loss up to the full 
amount of the insurance policy.20 Thus, the argument goes, the insured 
should not have to re-pay its insurer for the loss it agreed to assume unless 
the insured actually recovers 100% of that loss from the tortfeasor. The 
traditional rule undoubtedly favors the interests of insureds over subrogees, 
but also favors tort defendants and their liability insurers because it 
increases the likelihood that tort claims can be resolved short of trial, often 
for less money.21 
The second approach, referred to here as the “contract rule,” views 
contractual subrogation provisions in insurance policies as wholly 
enforceable and not subject to limitation or alteration by common law 
equitable principles.22 In its purest application, the contract rule preserves 
the insurer’s right to collect its subrogation interest from the very first 
dollar recovered from the third-party wrongdoer responsible for the loss.23 
This approach to subrogation is most often justified on freedom of contract 
grounds: where the parties have agreed to terms and the price of an 
insurance contract, the state should not interfere.24 Proponents of the 
contract rule maintain that the parties’ respective bargaining power is equal 
in the marketplace and that subrogation clauses in insurance contracts are 
granted to the insurer in exchange for valuable consideration in the form of 
lower premiums for the insured or greater coverage under the policy.25 By 
                                                                                                                 
Noyes, 36 N.J. Eq. 227 (Ch. 1882); Receivers of N.J. Midland Ry. Co. v. Wortendyke, 27 
N.J. Eq. 658 (1876); Appeal of Allegheny Nat. Bank, 7 A. 788 (Pa. 1887)). 
 20. See, e.g., Wimberly, 584 S.W.2d at 203–04; John Dwight Ingram, Priority 
Between Insurer and Insured in Subrogation Recoveries, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 105, 113 (1997). 
Concededly, however, the latter point would be true under any subrogation regime. 
 21. This view is based on the argument that where a substantial subrogation interest 
looms—but where the subrogation right is also recognized to be rooted in equity and thus 
potentially limited by the made-whole doctrine—the plaintiff can accept less money to settle 
the case with the tortfeasor because she will be able to compromise and settle the dispute 
with the subrogee for less than the entire amount of the claimed interest. 
 22. For a discussion regarding the development of the contract rule, see Maher & 
Pathak, supra note 18, at 72–77. 
 23. Id. at 75–76 (“First-dollar recovery provisions are contractual inversions of the 
equitable make whole rule: they provide the insurer with an entitlement to the first dollar of 
an insured’s recovery from a tortfeasor, regardless of whether the insured was made whole, 
regardless of what the insured’s recovery was for, and regardless of any attorneys’ fees 
incurred by the insured in obtaining a recovery.”). 
 24. Id. at 74. 
 25. This is not the view in Tennessee. See York v. Sevier Cnty. Ambulance Auth., 8 
S.W.3d 616, 621 (Tenn. 1999) (“The fallacy in this contention is that it presumes the 
plaintiffs had the bargaining power, leverage, or business acumen to negotiate the terms of 
this or any other standardized insurance contract. . . . The reality is that the vast majority of 
insurance policies stem from a group or network plan, in which the individual policy holder 
had no negotiating input and merely pays the premiums and accepts the terms.”); see also 
Hare v. State, 733 So.2d 277, 284 (Miss. 1999) (holding that “to allow the literal language of 
an insurance contract to destroy an insured’s equitable right to subrogation ignores the fact 
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extension of this logic, broader public policy arguments in favor of contract 
rule subrogation regimes assert that a legal model favoring first-dollar 
contractual subrogation rights for insurers lowers the risk of loss across the 
insurance industry, the cost savings from which are passed on to consumers 
in the form of lower premiums. However, empirical evidence of lower 
premiums resulting from the inclusion of subrogation clauses in insurance 
contracts is a topic of debate.26 Despite its assailable underpinnings and 
unfavorable results to injured insureds, the contract rule approach is a part 
of subrogation jurisprudence.27 It cannot be denied that the contract rule 
favors subrogees at the expense of the injured, and experienced lawyers 
know that this view of subrogation complicates the resolution of tort 
claims.28 
                                                                                                                 
that this type of contract is realistically a unilateral contract of insurance and overlooks the 
insured’s total lack of bargaining power in negotiating the terms of these types of 
agreements.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Maher & Pathak, supra note 18, at 58 n.31 (citing Rimes v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348, 355 (Wis. 1982) (“[T]here appears to be very little 
evidence that possible recoveries in subrogation are considered in the determination of 
insurance premiums.”)) (explaining that more empirical research is needed on whether 
insurers include expected subrogation recoveries into their rates, and noting that while 
commentators and courts are split on the issue, the dominant view appears to be that insurers 
have not historically factored subrogation recoveries into rate calculations); EDWIN W. 
PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 33, at 151 (2d ed. 1957) (“Subrogation is a 
windfall to the insurer. It plays no part in rate schedules . . . .”). But see F. Joseph Du Bray, 
A Response to the Anti-Subrogation Argument: What Really Emerged from Pandora’s Box, 
41 S.D. L. REV. 264, 273–74 (1996) (arguing that subrogation recoveries do lower rates). 
 27. The argument for a trend toward upholding contractual subrogation clauses in 
subrogation disputes is based largely on the preemptive effect of the subrogation provisions 
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(3), which the U.S. Supreme Court effectively interpreted in Sereboff v. Mid Atl. 
Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006), as permitting the strict enforcement of contractual 
subrogation provisions in employer-provided health plans. In addition to ERISA’s 
preemptive effect and massive scope, however, the argument for a trend in its direction is 
further supported by the influence that U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting 
ERISA potentially has in persuading state judiciaries to follow it and adopt the ERISA 
model. See, e.g., Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex. 2007) (characterizing 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sereboff as a “refus[al to] apply the ‘made whole’ 
doctrine” and relying in part on Sereboff to achieve the same result as a matter of state law). 
 28. The author contends that the presence of a significant subrogation interest that the 
tort claimant has no right to contest can have a significant impact on the ability to settle tort 
litigation. In a case where several liability applies, disputes over liability, damages, 
causation, collectability of excess judgments, and the allocation of any recovery among 
multiple stakeholders necessarily complicate settlement negotiations; but the existence of a 
subrogee demanding the first dollar of any settlement and every dollar thereafter until paid in 
full (with no discount for the costs of securing that recovery for subrogee’s benefit and 
without regard to comparative fault principles) adversely impacts the ability of tort plaintiffs 
and defendants to settle cases. Thus, the contract rule has an adverse impact on the injured 
and society—fewer settlements mean more trials (at more expense) and some number of 
losses by plaintiffs, which often results in the plaintiff seeking public assistance with 
medical expenses, food, and shelter. 
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B. The Made-Whole Doctrine in Tennessee 
In Tennessee, the made-whole doctrine is a common law equitable 
principle that precludes an insurer’s right of subrogation until the insured 
has been fully compensated, or “made whole,” for injuries caused by a 
third-party wrongdoer.29 The insurer’s right to subrogation is not triggered 
unless and until the insured’s cumulative recovery from the insurer and 
third-party wrongdoers exceeds the insured’s total loss, regardless of any 
contrary terms in the insurance contract.30 
The Tennessee Supreme Court first adopted the made-whole 
doctrine in the 1971 decision of Wimberly v. American Casualty Co.31 In 
this case, the insureds suffered $44,619 in fire damage to their property 
when a tortfeasor drove a car into a restaurant they owned.32 The owners 
recovered $15,000 from their own insurance carriers, and collected a 
settlement of $25,000 from the tortfeasor’s insurer.33 The insureds’ total 
compensation was thus $40,000, which was less than their total loss.34 
The owners’ insurance policies each contained a standard 
subrogation clause, and in addition, the insureds had executed “a proof of 
loss and subrogation receipt” assigning to the insurers all of the “rights, 
claims and interests” they might have against any liable third party.35 The 
insurance companies enforced these subrogation rights, and collected a pro 
rata share of $8,404.47 from the settlement.36 Their insureds filed suit to 
recover that amount.37 
The trial court ruled in favor of the insureds, but the intermediate 
appellate court reversed and held that the settlement proceeds should be 
equally distributed among the insureds and insurers.38 The Supreme Court 
reversed the court of appeals, and held “that an insured must be made whole 
before an insurer is entitled to subrogation against a tortfeasor.”39 The Court 
also made it clear that neither the subrogation provisions in the policies nor 
                                                 
 29. Wimberly v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 584 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tenn. 1979). 
 30. Id. at 203 (“The doctrine of subrogation in insurance does not arise from, nor is it 
dependent upon, statute or custom or any of the terms of the contract; it has its origin in 
general principles of equity and in the nature of the insurance contract as one of indemnity. 
The right of subrogation rests not upon a contract, but upon the principles of natural 
justice.”); York, 8 S.W.3d at 621 (“[O]ur case law is clear that an insurer is not entitled to 
subrogation unless and until the insured has been made whole for his or her losses, 
regardless of what language is contained in the contract.”); Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. 
Gifford, 239 S.W.3d 728, 730–31 (Tenn. 2007). 
 31. 584 S.W.2d 200. 
 32. Id. at 201. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 201–02. 
 36. Wimberly, 584 S.W.2d at 202. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 201. 
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the settlement-of-claim receipt signed by the insureds reaffirming the 
insurers’ subrogation rights was determinative, and added that such an 
outcome would be “at odds with the equitable principles of subrogation.”40 
The practical effect of the ruling was that subrogation provisions in 
insurance policies were not controlling, and in any event, could not be 
exercised until the insured was made whole. 
Importantly, the loss sustained in Wimberly was strictly to 
property.41 Therefore, the decision and the relevant facts of the case might 
be narrowly understood as limiting the application of the made-whole 
doctrine to cases involving damages to property. However, the Wimberly 
holding was eventually extended to personal injury actions involving the 
subrogation rights of first-party private insurers.42 
Although the Tennessee appellate courts consistently applied the 
made-whole doctrine to insurers’ subrogation rights in the context of 
personal injury actions beginning in 1992,43 the Tennessee Supreme Court 
did not have occasion to address the issue until 1999—twenty years after 
Wimberly. In two decisions that year—York v. Sevier County Ambulance 
Authority44 and Blankenship v. Estate of Bain45—the Court firmly 
established that the made-whole doctrine applied to insurers’ subrogation 
rights in personal injury cases. 
In addition to being the first Tennessee Supreme Court decision to 
apply the made-whole doctrine in a personal injury action, York also 
clarified that reimbursement clauses46 in insurance contracts were 
indistinguishable from subrogation clauses for the purposes of determining 
the rights of the insurer under the made-whole doctrine.47 The issue before 
                                                 
 40. Id. 
 41. Wimberly, 584 S.W.2d at 201. 
 42. See Mullins v. Parkey, 874 S.W.2d 12, 14–15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (applying 
made-whole doctrine to defeat insurer’s subrogation claim in personal injury action); Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Tenn. v. Christopher, No. 03A01-9412-CH-00429, 1995 WL 229060, 
at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1995) (applying made-whole doctrine to defeat insurer’s 
subrogation claim in personal injury action); Waller v. Ammon, No. 01A01-CV-00260, 
1998 WL 321569 at *4–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 1998) (applying the made-whole doctrine 
to an insurer’s subrogation claim); see also Todd L. Fulks, The “Made-Whole” Doctrine: Its 
Effect on Tennessee Tort Litigation and Insurance Subrogation Rights, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 
87, 98–107 (2001) (discussing line of cases developing the made-whole doctrine in 
Tennessee). 
 43. See Mullins, 874 S.W.2d at 12. 
 44. 8 S.W.3d 616 (Tenn. 1999). 
 45. 5 S.W.3d 647 (Tenn. 1999). 
 46. A “reimbursement clause” was a clause inserted into an insurance policy that 
worked just like a subrogation clause but was used to try to avoid the equitable 
underpinnings of subrogation. 
 47. York, 8 S.W.3d at 617, 619. The insured in York had received a settlement of 
$130,000 for injuries sustained in a head-on collision, which the trial court found to be less 
than the actual damages suffered. Id. at 618. When the insurer was impleaded into the 
lawsuit claiming a right to reimbursement for $19,149.97 in medical bills pursuant to a 
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the Court in York was “whether an insured must receive full compensation 
for losses, i.e., be ‘made whole,’ before an insurer may receive 
reimbursement for medical expenses paid on behalf of the insured.”48 Citing 
to Wimberly, the Court first held that there was no practical distinction 
between an insurer’s contractual right to reimbursement and a contractual 
right of subrogation, and noted that to hold otherwise “would allow an 
insurer to circumvent the ‘made whole’ doctrine simply by using a 
reimbursement provision in lieu of subrogation.”49 While the Court did 
discuss the conceptual and procedural differences between subrogation and 
reimbursement,50 it concluded that “a right of reimbursement raises many of 
the same equitable issues involved in subrogation and warrants the same 
conclusion—that the insured must be made whole before the insurer is 
entitled to reimbursement.”51 
The Blankenship52 case also addressed application of the made-
whole doctrine in the personal injury context, but is distinguishable from 
York in that the insurer asserting subrogation rights was the state’s medical 
assistance program, TennCare.53 The issue before the Court was whether a 
person who receives health care benefits under TennCare must be made 
whole before the State was entitled to subrogation for the medical expenses 
it paid on the person’s behalf.54 
The insurer argued that the relevant provision of the TennCare 
statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-117, created a statutory right to 
subrogation that trumped the common law made-whole doctrine.55 
Specifically, the insurer relied on the absence of any language in Section 
                                                                                                                 
provision in the insurance policy, the trial court refused to allow the reimbursement. Id. The 
Court of Appeals reversed, and the Tennessee Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. 
 48. Id. at 617. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 619 n.3 (“In their most basic forms . . . subrogation means that party A is 
substituted for party B and is allowed to raise the rights party B had against party C. 
Reimbursement simply allows party A to recover from party B payments it made on behalf 
of party B.”). 
 51. Id. at 620. 
 52. Blankenship v. Estate of Bain, 5 S.W.3d 647 (Tenn. 1999). The insured in 
Blankenship had been injured in a car accident that the trial court found was “caused by the 
negligence of Joshua Bain.” Id. at 649. The insured was enrolled in Tennessee’s TennCare 
program, through which the insured had acquired a policy with an insurer. Id. Under that 
policy, the insurer had paid medical expenses on the insured’s behalf in the amount of 
$20,713.83. Id. The insured brought an action against the tortfeasor’s estate and settled for 
$125,000, which constituted the policy limits of the defendant’s liability insurance coverage. 
Id. The insurer intervened in the suit and asserted a right of subrogation equal to the amount 
of benefits provided on its insured’s behalf. Id. The Court noted that “(a)lthough the suit was 
settled for the limit of Bain’s policy, the trial court found that the [insureds] would have 
been entitled to recover damages well in excess of $125,000.” Id. 
 53. Id. at 649. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 651. 
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71-5-117(a) indicating that the State’s right to subrogation was subject to 
the insured’s first being made whole:56 
Medical Assistance paid to, or on behalf of, any recipient 
cannot be recovered from a beneficiary unless such 
assistance has been incorrectly paid, or, unless the recipient 
or beneficiary recovers or is entitled to recover from a third 
party reimbursement for all or part of the costs of care or 
treatment for the injury or illness for which the medical 
assistance is paid. To the extent of payments of medical 
assistance, the state shall be subrogated to all rights of 
recovery, for the cost of care or treatment for the injury or 
illness for which medical assistance is provided, 
contractual or otherwise, of the recipients against any 
person.57 
The Court held that the made-whole doctrine applied58 and rejected 
the insurer’s argument and interpretation of the statute.59 Noting that the 
TennCare legislation was enacted post-Wimberly, the Court reasoned that 
the legislature must have been aware of the existing state of the law when 
drafting the bill, and so must have intended “the statute to reflect the 
equitable principle that subrogation is subject to the made-whole 
doctrine.”60 The Court went on to point out that if the legislature had 
intended a different interpretation, it could have simply stated in precise 
language that the made-whole doctrine did not apply to subrogation rights 
in the context of the TennCare program.61 
The precise manner in which the made-whole doctrine was to be 
applied by the trial courts—in particular, which sources of the insured’s 
recovery should be factored into determining whether the insured had been 
made whole—was unclear until a case presented itself to the Court for 
review of that issue in 2007. In Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Gifford, the 
Court clarified that an insured’s total recovery is to be determined by 
adding all benefits received as a result of an incident.62 The trial court 
below, in computing the insured’s total recovery for the purposes of 
                                                 
 56. Id. 
 57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-117(a) (2013). 
 58. Blankenship, 5 S.W.3d at 653. 
 59. Id. at 651. 
 60. Id. The Court’s citing Wimberly as representing the state of the law at that time is 
tenuous given that the Court had not specifically held that the made-whole doctrine applied 
to personal injury cases until after TennCare’s enactment. See York v. Sevier Cnty. 
Ambulance Auth., 8 S.W.3d 616 (Tenn. 1999). 
 61. Blankenship, 5 S.W.3d at 651. Shortly after the Blankenship decision, the 
legislature responded and made clear its intent with regard to application of the made-whole 
doctrine to the state’s subrogation rights in TennCare cases by amending Section 71-5-117 
of the Tennessee Code and superseding Blankenship. 
 62. 239 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tenn. 2007). 
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determining whether he was made whole, included the insured’s settlement 
proceeds with the tortfeasor, but failed to include payments received from 
the insured’s health insurance providers in its calculation.63 The Supreme 
Court rejected this approach and explained that the trial courts should 
support its made-whole determinations with specific findings of fact 
regarding the monetary value of the injured party’s recovery from all 
sources and the monetary value of the injured party’s total damages.64 The 
Court further held that trial courts should make specific findings as to the 
value of each separate element of an injured party’s damages.65 Finally, the 
opinion made clear that if the trial courts find that the injured party had 
been made whole, reimbursement should be awarded to the insurer only to 
the extent that the injured party’s total recovery exceeded the injured 
party’s total damages.66 The Court noted that these guidelines were 
necessary to ensure that the made-whole doctrine was applied 
consistently.67 
Taken together, the foregoing decisions by the Tennessee Supreme 
Court essentially represent the corpus of substantive law in the State 
regarding the interplay between subrogation and the made-whole doctrine 
in tort litigation. As scarce as precedent is in this area, the current state of 
the law is clear enough to allow us to explore how the made-whole doctrine 
would be applied in Tennessee today. Consider the following hypothetical: 
Hypothetical 1—Current Application of the Made-Whole 
Doctrine in Tennessee 
A is injured in a car accident with B. B is undeniably and 
solely at fault. A’s private health insurer, XYZ, pays 
$25,000 in medical bills arising from the accident. 
Reasonable minds agree that A’s claim is worth $200,000. 
B has only $100,000 in liability insurance (which is paid to 
A), and B’s personal obligation to A is discharged in 
bankruptcy. Under the made-whole doctrine, A need not 
pay XYZ any money on its subrogation interest because the 
sum total of the monies received by A ($100,000 in liability 
coverage plus $25,000 in health insurance benefits) is less 
than the $200,000 value of the tort claim, i.e., A’s made-
whole amount. 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 731–32. 
 64. Id. at 732. Significantly, Gifford further recognized that although requiring such 
factual determinations would entail the additional time and expense of conducting the 
equivalent of an additional trial, such a proceeding “may be the only reliable means to 
determine whether an injured party has been made whole.” Id. 
 65. Id. The Proposal refers to this principle as the “strict segregation of damages.” 
Infra Section III(C). 
 66. Gifford, 239 S.W.3d at 732. 
 67. Id. 
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The table below illustrates how application of the current 
Tennessee made-whole rule to Hypothetical 1 would result in various 
recovery scenarios depending on the settlement amount: 
 
A’s Total 
Loss (A’s 
“Made- 
Whole” 
Amount) 
Amount 
XYZ 
Paid on 
A’s 
Policy 
for 
Medical 
Bills 
A’s 
Settlement 
with B 
A’s Gross 
Recovery 
from All 
Sources 
(including 
XYZ’s 
Payment 
of Medical 
Bills) 
XYZ’s 
Entitlement 
from 
Subrogation 
A’s Net 
from All 
Sources 
after XYZ’s 
Subrogation 
Amount A 
Actually 
Receives 
from B’s 
Settlement 
Proceeds 
$200,000 $25,000 $100,000 $125,000 $0 $125,000 $100,000 
$200,000 $25,000 $150,000 $175,000 $0 $175,000 $150,000 
$200,000 $25,000 $175,000 $200,000 $0 $200,000 $175,000 
$200,000 $25,000 $200,000 $225,000 $25,000 $200,000 $175,000 
 
One can see that a strict application of the current made-whole 
doctrine in Tennessee presents a potential injustice to insurers. A plaintiff 
may recover 99% of his or her damages and not be required to reimburse 
the health insurer one nickel for the amount it paid for medical bills on the 
plaintiff’s behalf. While it is true there are lots of injustices in the law, 
especially in statutory law, the judicial system should work toward the goal 
of equity for all parties, and thus such a scenario is not ideal. 
That being said, the made-whole doctrine has been applied to 
personal injury and wrongful death cases in Tennessee for over a decade,68 
and if one were to accept the asserted logic of those who favor the 
contractual view of subrogation, health insurers and other insurers have 
already taken this principle into account in setting premiums.69 Presumably 
then, plaintiffs and other insurance policyholders have paid and will 
continue to pay more for insurance because of the decreased likelihood of 
recovering a subrogation interest under the made-whole rule.70 Thus, each 
tort claimant facing a subrogation claim has paid for the right to use the 
made-whole doctrine to his economic advantage. 
                                                 
 68. See York v. Sevier Cnty. Ambulance Auth., 8 S.W.3d 616 (Tenn. 1999). 
 69. See generally Du Bray, supra note 26. 
 70. Id. at 274 (arguing that insurance carriers recognize subrogation recovery as an 
appropriate and generally accepted source of revenue, and that “[i]f subrogation recovery 
were not available or were disregarded, the actual cost of insuring the past known risk would 
increase accordingly and the projected future costs would likewise have to be adjusted 
upward. Subrogation costs not recovered are thus reflected in and spread over future 
premiums among the issuing insurer and all of the insureds purchasing the same insurance. 
As a result, all who shared the risk during the time the claim was paid, and all who share the 
future risk, subsidize the payment to an insured who did not honor his or her subrogation 
agreement.”). 
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PART II. CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY THE CURRENT BODY OF 
TENNESSEE LAW REGARDING THE MADE-WHOLE DOCTRINE  
(OR, RATHER, THE ABSENCE OF IT) 
As indicated in the Introduction, the Tennessee Supreme Court has 
not yet been presented with any cases that test the limits of the made-whole 
doctrine to determine whether it will stay true to its equitable roots. What 
follows is a partial list of comparative fault issues that remain undecided 
with regard to their effect on subrogation rights: 
 
a. The allocation of fault against an entity protected by the 
statute of repose; 
b. The allocation of fault against a non-party tortfeasor; 
c. The allocation of fault against a governmental entity that 
results in a damages assessment against that entity in 
excess of statutory damage caps; 
d. The allocation of fault against a person or entity in excess 
of caps on non-economic damages; 
e. The allocation of fault against a governmental entity that is 
immune from suit; 
f. The allocation of fault against a party not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts; 
g. The allocation of fault against a party immune from suit 
under the common law; and 
h. The allocation of fault against a party who has received a 
bankruptcy discharge for personal liability over and above 
applicable liability insurance proceeds. 
 
In addition, there is substantial uncertainty about the following 
questions: 
 
a. How does one determine whether a plaintiff has been 
“made whole”? 
b.  What happens if a portion of a judgment is uncollectable or 
not readily collectable? 
c. Can the subrogation interest be paid from monies awarded 
for damages unrelated to the subrogee’s expenses? 
d. Can a plaintiff and tort defendant allocate settlement 
money in an effort to defeat—or in a manner that has the 
effect of defeating—a subrogation interest? 
e. Must a tort plaintiff secure a subrogee’s approval before 
settling with a tortfeasor? 
f. If not, can a subrogee contest the reasonableness of that 
settlement? 
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g. Should the monies paid by a tort plaintiff for the cost of 
obtaining a settlement or judgment that benefits, in part, the 
subrogee be charged against the subrogation interest? 
 
The resolution of these issues has real-life implications for 
thousands of Tennesseans every year. Given the way such matters work 
their way through the court system, it will take decades to answer these 
questions. And in the absence of a cohesive framework within which to 
analyze and confront them, it is possible (and perhaps unavoidable) that the 
determination of cases will turn on facts that will not, in the long run, best 
serve the equitable foundations of subrogation and the made-whole 
doctrine. 
PART III. THE MODIFIED MADE-WHOLE DOCTRINE:  
A NEW COMMON LAW MODEL FOR TENNESSEE 
As creatures of equity, it should fall to the Tennessee courts, not the 
legislature, to modify the interplay between subrogation rules, comparative 
fault law, and the made-whole doctrine to produce a workable model that 
yields the fairest result.71 The courts are simply better suited to exercise 
their inherent power to promulgate the rules governing an equitable 
doctrine and to adapt that doctrine to new situations as they inevitably 
arise.72 
To assist the courts in adopting a comprehensive approach to future 
development of made-whole law, the author offers the Modified Made-
                                                 
 71. Objections that this mechanism for modifying the law is judicial activism or 
“legislating from the bench” are inevitable. Such a cry is always heard from the one side or 
the other in any dispute or policy debate. Courts in common law jurisdictions have long 
acted within their power to modify the law where the legislature has not acted or has not 
been clear, especially in matters of equity. See, e.g., Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. 557, 565 
(1869) (holding that courts have wide discretion to fashion relief in cases of equity, and 
stating that “relief is not a matter of absolute right to either party; it is a matter resting in the 
discretion of the court, to be exercised upon a consideration of all the circumstances of each 
particular case.”). 
 72. This is not to say that the legislature could not enact a subrogation statute that 
included very broad language to at least establish the framework of a new subrogation 
model; at least one other jurisdiction has taken this approach. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-
2-19 (2013) (“If a subrogation claim or other lien or claim that arose out of the payment of 
medical expenses or other benefits exists in respect to a claim for personal injuries or death 
and the claimant’s recovery is diminished: (1) by comparative fault; or (2) by reason of the 
uncollectibility of the full value of the claim for personal injuries or death resulting from 
limited liability insurance or from any other cause; the lien or claim shall be diminished in 
the same proportion as the claimant’s recovery is diminished. The party holding the lien or 
claim shall bear a pro rata share of the claimant’s attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.”). 
However, such sweeping language still requires the courts to develop and fashion the law 
from such a bare bones statute. The proposed common law approach is preferable because it 
is more in keeping with the history of the equitable nature of the two doctrines at issue and 
with the common law roots of comparative fault law. 
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Whole Doctrine Proposal.73 This Proposal is governed by the following 
fundamental principles: 
 
PRINCIPLE 1 
No subrogee is entitled to recover from its insured monies that the insured 
did not recover from a tortfeasor. Principle 1 is advanced by applying the 
following rules, each of which is applied as appropriate under the 
circumstances to determine the gross subrogation interest74 that a subrogee 
has or would have in the proceeds of a tort lawsuit between its insured and 
a third party. 
 
Rule 1. A subrogation interest is reduced by the percentage of 
comparative fault assessed against the insured. 
 
Rule 2. A subrogation interest is reduced by the percentage of 
comparative fault assessed against a tortfeasor who cannot be sued 
by the insured because of the expiration of a statute of repose. 
 
Rule 3. A subrogation interest is reduced by the percentage of 
comparative fault assessed against a tortfeasor that enjoys 
statutory or common law immunity from suit. 
 
Rule 4. A subrogation interest is reduced proportionally to reflect 
the unavailability of those damages assessed against a government 
entity that would otherwise have been awarded but for a law 
limiting the amount of damages that can be awarded against the 
governmental entity. 
 
Rule 5. A subrogation interest is reduced by the percentage of 
comparative fault assessed against a non-party not subject to the 
jurisdiction of Tennessee courts. 
 
                                                 
 73. Readers will note substantial similarity between the Proposal and the statute 
governing TennCare subrogation interests, Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-117. In 2000, legislation 
was introduced to repeal the Blankenship decision, which had applied the made-whole 
doctrine to payments made by insurers participating in the State’s TennCare program. See 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-117 (2013). The author, as a representative of the Tennessee Trial 
Lawyers Association, drafted the substitute bill that became the new method of adjusting 
subrogation rights under TennCare. The author gratefully acknowledges the willingness of 
the Sundquist Administration and the legislation’s sponsors—Senator Jerry Cooper and 
Representative Jere Hargrove—to negotiate a fair compromise on this issue. 
 74. The author has defined the following terms that are used in the balance of this 
Article as follows: An “asserted subrogation interest” is the amount sought by the subrogee. 
A “gross subrogation interest” is the amount of the subrogation interest after the Rules set 
forth in Principle 1 have been applied to an asserted subrogation interest. A “net subrogation 
interest” is what the subrogee has the right to recover after the gross subrogation interest has 
been reduced by recovery acquisition costs. 
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Rule 6. A subrogation interest is reduced by the percentage of the 
insured’s total damages that the insured is unable to collect from a 
tortfeasor. 
 
PRINCIPLE 2 
The gross subrogation interest is reduced proportionally by the reasonable 
recovery acquisition costs that the insured paid to secure the tort recovery 
for his or her benefit and for the benefit of the subrogee. A subrogee is 
permitted to challenge the reasonableness of the asserted recovery 
acquisition costs but is not entitled to any discount for the amount it pays to 
its own counsel in the matter unless the court determines that the 
subrogee’s counsel materially participated in the proceedings. 
 
PRINCIPLE 3 
A subrogee does not have a right to collect a subrogation interest from 
monies awarded for any loss other than the loss giving rise to the 
subrogation interest. 
 
PRINCIPLE 4 
No out-of-court effort by the insured or a tortfeasor to allocate fault, 
determine insured’s damages, or allocate damages among several plaintiffs 
shall be binding on the subrogee absent consent of the subrogee. 
 
PRINCIPLE 5 
An insured and a tortfeasor may settle a tort claim for an amount equal to 
or more than the entire asserted subrogation interest without the 
permission of the subrogee. However, if the subrogee later challenges the 
reasonableness of that settlement, the insured will bear the duty of 
demonstrating that the settlement was reasonable. An insured and a 
tortfeasor may not settle a tort claim for an amount less than an asserted 
subrogation interest without the permission of a subrogee or the court 
(after notice to the subrogee). 
 
What follows is a more detailed description of each Principle and, 
with regard to Principle 1, the rules that advance it.75 
A. Principle 1—Creating an Equitable Subrogation Interest 
No subrogee is entitled to recover from its insured monies that the insured 
did not recover from a tortfeasor. 
 
                                                 
 75. Nothing in the Proposal should be construed as rejection of current law that 
prohibits an insurance company from inserting language in the insurance policy that purports 
to waive the application of the made-whole rule. On the contrary, the Proposal is drafted 
with the assumption and belief that the Principles and Rules cannot be altered by contract. 
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A subrogee has nothing more, and nothing less, than the right to 
stand in the shoes of its insured. Every single rule set forth below advances 
this fundamental precept. 
Rule 1: The asserted subrogation interest is reduced by 
the percentage of comparative fault assessed against the 
insured. 
Any workable subrogation model that strives toward equity must 
first take into account comparative fault principles when calculating 
subrogation interests.76 Rule 1 accounts for the degree to which the plaintiff 
is at fault and proportionally adjusts the subrogation interest according to 
that fault assessment. 
Rule 1 gets at the essence of the subrogation right. Recall that the 
insurer’s right of subrogation can only arise from and exist against a third-
party tortfeasor, and the relevant doctrinal justification for the subrogation 
right is that the party responsible for causing the harm should pay for the 
resulting loss. However, the entire purpose of purchasing first-party private 
insurance (such as health insurance) is to protect one’s self against such a 
loss. A refusal to reduce the insurer’s subrogation interest proportionally by 
the percentage of fault allocated to the insured equates to the insurer 
recovering directly from its insured the very type of loss it was paid to 
indemnify—i.e., the insured’s own risk to causing herself an injury. In 
essence, a claim for that money is not a subrogation claim at all, because 
the insurer is seeking restitution of payment made for a loss caused (albeit 
in part) by the insured, not a third party. There is simply no rational 
justification for failing to take the insured’s fault into consideration when 
balancing the equities of a subrogation right. 
Hypothetical 2—Reduction by Percentage of Fault 
Allocated to Insured77 
A is injured in a motor vehicle wreck involving B. B asserts 
the fault of A. A’s medical bills are $50,000 and are paid by 
                                                 
 76. Tennessee adopted the doctrine of modified comparative fault in 1992. McIntyre 
v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d. 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992). The purpose of comparative fault is to assess 
liability in proportion to fault. Sherer v. Linginfelter, 29 S.W.3d 451, 455 (Tenn. 2000); 
Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420, 430 (Tenn. 1996) (“[W]here the separate, 
independent negligent acts of more than one tortfeasor combine to cause a single, indivisible 
injury, each tortfeasor will be liable only for that proportion of the damages attributable to its 
fault.”). 
 77. Readers will note that each of the following hypotheticals includes reference to a 
subrogation interest arising out of a health insurance policy. Subrogation interests also arise 
in short- and long-term disability policies, medical payment and collision provisions of 
automobile liability policies, etc. Reference is made to health insurance policies because 
those are what tort practitioners deal with on a daily basis and, because of the sums involved, 
present the biggest obstacle to the resolution of tort claims. 
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her health insurer, XYZ. At trial, the jury awards $50,000 
for medical bills and $200,000 in other damages, but finds 
A 20% at fault. Thus, when a judgment is entered for A 
against B, the judgment amount is $200,000 ($250,000 in 
total damages reduced by the 20% fault allocated to A). 
Under the Proposal, XYZ’s asserted subrogation interest is 
also reduced by 20% (from $50,000 to $40,000) to take 
into account the fact that A only recovered $40,000 of his 
medical bills because of the 20% allocation of fault to A. 
Rule 2: The asserted subrogation interest is reduced by 
the percentage of comparative fault assessed against a 
tortfeasor who cannot be sued by the insured because of 
the expiration of a statute of repose.78 
The second Rule addresses statutes of repose. These statutes 
extinguish the liability of a tortfeasor where a statutorily set amount of time 
has passed between the time of the tortfeasor’s act and the resulting injury 
or death to a person.79 This is a grant of a type of immunity to a special 
class of persons or entities.80 
                                                 
 78. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the trier of fact should be allowed to 
consider the fault of a tortfeasor who is protected from liability due to a statute of repose. 
Dotson v. Blake, 29 S.W.3d 26, 29 (Tenn. 2000). 
 79. Statutes of repose begin to run with the happening of an event that is unrelated to 
the traditional accrual of a plaintiff’s cause of action. Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 
181, 184 (Tenn. 2000). The application of a statute of repose may result in the plaintiff 
losing the right to sue a defendant before that right has arisen; i.e., before the plaintiff was 
injured or died. Id.; see also Calaway ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509, 515 
(Tenn. 2005) (noting the distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose; 
“A statute of limitations normally governs the time within which legal proceedings must be 
commenced after a cause of action accrues. A statute of repose, on the other hand, limits the 
time within which an action may be brought and is unrelated to the accrual of any cause of 
action. A further distinction is that statutes of repose are substantive rather than procedural. 
Statutes of repose are substantive and extinguish both the right and the remedy while statutes 
of limitations are procedural, extinguishing only the remedy. Thus, a statute of repose 
typically does not bar a cause of action; its effect, rather, is to prevent what might otherwise 
be a cause of action from ever arising. . . . The injured party literally has no cause of action. 
The harm that has been done is damnum absque injuria—a wrong for which the law allows 
no redress. The function of the statute is thus rather to define substantive rights than to alter 
or modify a remedy.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because a statute of 
repose can bar a cause of action before it arises, statutes of repose are legislative grants of 
immunity. See 17 JOHN A. DAY ET AL., TENNNESSEE PRACTICE SERIES TENNESSEE LAW OF 
COMPARATIVE FAULT § 5:12 (2013 ed.). 
 80. Although the holding in Dotson has not yet been extended to any statute of repose 
other than the one favoring the construction industry, it is virtually certain that the court will 
apply Dotson to all statutes of repose absent legislative action to the contrary. Other than the 
construction industry (TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-202 (2013) (barring claims 4 years after 
substantial completion of an improvement to real property)), the following groups receive 
the benefit of immunity in Tennessee in the event a statute of repose enacted for them 
expires: the medical industry (TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (2013) (barring medical 
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In a tort case where a statute of repose protects the sole defendant 
and suit was not brought within the prescribed period, the tort plaintiff’s 
case is dismissed and the tort plaintiff’s subrogee, if any, receives nothing 
in satisfaction of its subrogation interest. However, in a tort case with 
multiple defendants, if one of the defendants is protected by a statute of 
repose and that defendant is granted summary judgment because suit was 
not brought within the prescribed period, that defendant may still be blamed 
by the other parties and be attributed fault as a non-party by the finder of 
fact.81 The attribution of fault to a non-party under these circumstances 
diminishes the plaintiff’s recovery accordingly. 
The rationale in allowing a defendant to assert fault against a non-
party who benefits from a statute of repose is that it “achieve[s] the fairest 
result possible by linking liability with fault” and that to not allow it would 
impose liability disproportionate to fault, which is “plainly inconsistent” 
with a comparative fault scheme.82 The following hypothetical illustrates 
the detrimental impact that a statute of repose has on a plaintiff’s recovery 
and shows how Rule 2 of the Proposal is applied to produce a more 
equitable outcome with regard to the subrogation interest. 
Hypothetical 3—Reduction by Percentage of Fault 
Allocated to a Non-Party Protected from Suit by Statute of 
Repose 
A is injured in a car wreck. A asserts that B’s negligence 
caused the wreck. A sues B, and then B asserts fault against 
SSS corporation, the manufacturer of A’s vehicle, alleging 
that A’s injuries are substantially due to a defective seat 
belt in A’s vehicle. A then adds SSS as a party defendant. 
SSS moves for and is granted dismissal from the suit under 
the applicable statute of repose because A’s vehicle was 
                                                                                                                 
malpractice actions brought “more than three (3) years after the date on which the negligent 
act or omission occurred except where there is fraudulent concealment on the part of the 
defendant, in which case the action shall be commenced within one (1) year after discovery 
that the cause of action exists.”)); product manufacturers (TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a) 
(2013) (barring claims 10 years “from the date on which the product was first purchased for 
use or consumption, or within one (1) year after the expiration of the anticipated life of the 
product, whichever is shorter”)); exceptions are made for asbestos injuries (giving no time 
limit) (TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(b) (2013)) and silicone breast implants (allowing for 
25 years) (TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(c) (2013)); those involved in the sale of securities 
(TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-122(h) (2013) (2 years after the act or transaction constituting the 
violation)); and corporate officers and directors (TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-601 (2013) 
(barring claims 3 years “after the date on which the breach or violation occurred, except 
where there is fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant, in which case the action 
shall be commenced within one (1) year after the alleged breach or violation is, or should 
have been, discovered.”)); see also DAY ET AL., supra note 79, § 5:12. 
 81. Dotson, 29 S.W.3d at 29. 
 82. Id. 
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more than ten years old at the time of A’s wreck with B. 
The case goes to trial, and although B is assessed with 50% 
fault for causing the incident itself and contributing to the 
injuries, B proves that the defective seat belt was the cause 
of 50% of A’s injuries. Under Tennessee’s comparative 
fault scheme, A bears the financial consequence of a 50% 
fault allocation against SSS, and thus A can recover only 
from B and may recover only 50% of his total damages. 
Rule 2 requires a 50% reduction in the asserted subrogation 
interest (equal to the 50% fault assessed to SSS). 
An appropriate subrogation model must take this situation into 
account. Reasonable minds can debate whether it is “fair” to force A to bear 
the financial consequence of the legislature’s decision to grant immunity to 
SSS under these circumstances. However, no one can deny that if this is the 
law—and it is—A can recover only that percentage of incurred medical 
expenses that can be assessed against B. Rule 2 of the Proposal simply takes 
this fact into account and would reduce the asserted subrogation interest by 
50% because (a) the insured did not receive 50% of her medical bills due to 
an expired statute of repose as to one tortfeasor (here, SSS), and (b) the 
subrogee should not be able to recover from its insured money the insured 
never received. 
More fundamentally, the basic concept of equitable subrogation, as 
defined, justifies this reduction and tells us how to adjust the subrogation 
interest here: The subrogee stands in the shoes of its insured, and acquires 
all the rights that the insured has against the third-party tortfeasor. If the 
insured has lost a right because of a statute of repose defense and does not 
recover some percentage of his loss as a result, then the subrogee, standing 
in its insured’s shoes, loses the same right and cannot recover a 
corresponding percentage of its loss. 
Rule 3: A subrogation interest is reduced by the 
percentage of comparative fault assessed against a 
tortfeasor that enjoys statutory or common law immunity 
from suit. 
This Rule addresses other types of immunity granted to private 
persons and entities as well as public entities. A defendant to a lawsuit who 
is determined to be truly immune from suit, such as a governmental entity,83 
                                                 
 83. The doctrine of sovereign immunity derives from the ancient legal principle that a 
sovereign cannot be sued in court. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 132–34 
(1812) (Pinkney, A.G., in reply) (“[T]he rights of a foreign sovereign cannot be submitted to 
a judicial tribunal.”).While the doctrine’s enduring legitimacy in the modern context is a 
topic of voluminous debate beyond the scope of this Article, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
contemporary jurisprudence has consistently upheld the doctrine with regard to the states’ 
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is simply dismissed from the suit.84 However, Tennessee courts have 
determined that the immediate beneficiaries of this “get out of jail free 
card” may still be assigned fault at trial if fault is asserted against them by a 
remaining defendant in the case.85 Fault allocation thus diminishes the tort 
plaintiff’s recovery in the same manner as an allocation of fault against a 
                                                                                                                 
immunity from suit; see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding sovereign 
immunity broadly protects state governments from being sued in state court without their 
consent); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (limiting ability of Congress to 
authorize suits against state governments that would undermine state immunity). In 
Tennessee, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has both a constitutional and statutory basis. 
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17; TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-13-102(a) (2013); Jones v. L & N R.R. 
Co., 617 S.W.2d 164, 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (noting both as sources of the doctrine). In 
its purest sense, sovereign immunity in Tennessee prevents a sovereign governmental entity 
from even being sued in its own courts absent legislative consent; if a defendant is truly 
immune, then any action would simply be dismissed as to such defendant. See Wells v. 
Tennessee Bd. of Regents, 231 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hawks v. City of 
Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1997)); Williams v. State, 139 S.W.3d 308, 311 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); Lewis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign 
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963). As such, the rationale for taking into account the fault 
assessed against an immune defendant in determining an insurer’s net subrogation interest 
mirrors the justifications for taking into account the fault assessed to a non-party. See Carroll 
v. Whitney, 29 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that when a defendant raises the non-
party defense in a negligence action, a jury may generally apportion fault to immune non-
parties); infra Sections III(A) Rules 4–6. 
 84. Other people and organizations are also granted a degree of immunity as well 
under certain circumstances. For example, common law immunity still protects parents from 
suit by their children for “conduct that constitutes the exercise of parental authority, the 
performance of parental supervision, and the provision of parental care and custody.” 
Broadwell by Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471, 476–77 (Tenn. 1994). In addition, 
while charitable organizations in Tennessee are not immune from tort suits for the negligent 
acts and omissions of their agents, servants, or employees, any judgment entered against a 
charitable institution cannot be collected from the property of a charitable trust. See O’Quin 
v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 201 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tenn. 1947); Anderson v. Armstrong, 171 
S.W.2d 401, 402 (Tenn. 1943). This creates a situation in which a plaintiff has a right to sue 
but no right to collect a judgment. See DAY ET AL., supra note 79, § 5:16. There are also 
circumstances in which the law limits a plaintiff’s ability to sue in tort unless the plaintiff 
can prove more than simple negligence. For example, certain directors and members of 
governing boards, as well as trustees of certain groups, are immune from suit absent willful, 
wanton, or gross negligence. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-58-601(c)–(e) (2013) (listing 
persons and entities exempted from liability for ordinary negligence). Tennessee law also 
limits the circumstances under which those who are engaged in equine activities can be held 
liable for negligence, instead requiring proof of willful or wanton misconduct. TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 44-20-101–105 (2013). Even landowners under certain conditions are immune from 
suit unless grossly negligent under the Tennessee Landowner Statute. TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 70-7-101–105 (2013). Somewhat related to the concept of immunity are the largely 
unsettled questions in Tennessee concerning whether “acts of God” or animals may be 
attributed any degree of comparative fault. See generally DAY ET AL., supra note 79, 
§§ 5:18–19 (noting that while Tennessee courts have not ruled on the question of whether 
God or animals can be found at fault, a “strong argument can be made . . . that fault can only 
be assigned to a ‘person’ who can be subjected to the judicial process.”). 
 85. Carroll v. Whitney, 29 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that when a defendant 
raises the non-party defense in a negligence action, a jury may generally apportion fault to 
immune non-parties). 
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non-party or a defendant protected from suit by a statute of repose. 
Consider the following: 
Hypothetical 4—Reduction by Percentage of Fault 
Allocated to an Immune Non-Party 
A is hurt in a car accident involving B. B asserts that Local 
Government was at fault in the accident, and A joins Local 
Government as a party defendant. XYZ Insurance 
Company, A’s health insurer, pays $25,000 for medical 
bills incurred as a result of the accident and asserts a 
subrogation interest for that amount. Local Government is 
dismissed from the case because the court found it to be 
immune from suit under the discretionary function 
exception to the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The case 
proceeds to trial against B. The jury attributes 50% of the 
fault to B and 50% of the fault to non-party Local 
Government. A’s total damages are determined to be 
$150,000 at trial. Thus, a judgment is entered against B for 
$75,000, or one half of the total damages suffered by A. 
Rule 3 of the Proposal would reduce XYZ Insurance 
Company’s asserted subrogation interest to $12,500 to 
reflect the fact that A only recovered half of his medical 
bills because of the fault allocated to the immune Local 
Government. 
The fundamental premise here is the same as discussed 
immediately above when addressing statutes of repose: The costs of a 
decision by our legislature or our courts to give protection from suit to 
certain people or entities because of their status or function in society must 
be borne by both the injured person and the subrogee who stands in that 
injured person’s shoes.86 
Rule 4: A subrogation interest is reduced proportionately 
to reflect the unavailability of those damages assessed 
against a government entity that would otherwise have 
been awarded but for a law limiting the amount of 
damages that can be awarded against the governmental 
entity. 
                                                 
 86. Any contrary view leads to absurd results. For example, if a subrogee can recover 
nothing from its insured where the sole tortfeasor is immune from suit, what possible basis 
in law or logic justifies an insured’s being held responsible for 100% of the subrogation 
interest where an immune party is 90% at fault? 
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This Rule takes into account situations where a governmental entity 
may be sued for its wrongful conduct, but a statutory damage cap limits its 
liability.87 In such cases, the law of comparative fault forces the plaintiff 
alone to bear the financial consequences of the damages cap.88 In addition 
to similar justifications previously discussed,89 the rationale for limiting the 
liability of government entities tends to focus on the idea that society as a 
whole benefits from the bargain struck—that is, if the government is 
required to pay the full amount of damages for the harm it causes to a 
citizen or other person or entity, society at large suffers in turn because that 
loss payment is ultimately passed on to citizens in the form of higher 
taxes.90 Thus, the argument goes, limiting the government’s liability to an 
artificial cap balances the policy goals of (partially) compensating tort 
victims for their losses while minimizing the impact on the tax base.91 
Furthermore, the government, as distinguished from the electorate, directly 
benefits from limited liability in that it has finite resources with which to 
meet its obligations.92 
Therefore, refusing to take into account the limited liability of 
government entity tort defendants in calculating an insurer’s subrogation 
interest in a tort suit unjustly enriches the subrogee (who also receives the 
“benefit” of limited government liability) at the sole expense of the 
plaintiff-insured. The following hypothetical illustrates the problem and 
how Rule 4 is applied: 
                                                 
 87. The statutory basis for a government entity’s limited liability is set forth in two 
provisions of the Tennessee Code: the Government Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) governs 
claims against counties, municipalities, and other local governmental agencies, but does not 
apply to state government, its agencies, and departments. TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 29-20-101–
408 (2013). Claims against the State of Tennessee are governed by the Claims Commission 
Act. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-301–310 (2013). Each includes a statutory cap on damages on 
a per person, per accident basis. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-20-311, 9-8-307 (2013). 
 88. If this Proposal is fully adopted, consistency requires that statutory damage caps 
on non-economic losses be treated differently. Why? Because recent tort reform legislation 
caps only non-economic damages, not economic losses such as medical expenses. TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (2013). Thus, under Principle 3—segregation of damages—the fact 
that these statutes do not impact a tort plaintiff’s ability to recover economic losses, 
including medical expenses, means that a subrogee’s rights should be not be discounted 
simply because other elements of plaintiff’s losses have been statutorily limited. The 
statutory caps applicable to state and local governments are different. See supra note 87. 
Because they cap damages regardless of their classification, equity demands that damages 
lost because of the cap apply proportionately to each category of loss. 
 89. See supra note 83. 
 90. See Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, 
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 844–47 (2007). 
 91. Id. at 855. 
 92. See id. at 844–47. 
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Hypothetical 5—Reduction by Percentage of Fault 
Allocated to a Limited Liability Government Entity 
A is hurt by the negligence of B and State Government. 
XYZ Insurance Company, A’s health insurer, pays 
$250,000 for medical bills incurred as a result of the 
accident and asserts a subrogation interest. The jury 
determines that B is 50% at fault and State Government is 
50% at fault, and that A’s damages are $1,000,000. In post-
trial motions, the trial judge reduces the $500,000 in 
damages allocated by the jury to the State Government to 
$300,000, consistent with the requirement of the State 
Board of Claims Act. Thus, A receives a judgment against 
B for $500,000 and against State Government for $300,000 
and the $200,000 shortfall created by a financial cap on 
State Government’s responsibility reduces A’s overall 
recovery by 20%. Under the Proposal, XYZ’s subrogation 
interest is reduced by 20%, from $250,000 to $200,000, to 
reflect the fact that A did not recover $50,000 of her 
medical bills because of the limitation on the financial 
responsibility of State Government. 
Under Rule 4, the asserted subrogation interest is reduced by a 
percentage derived by dividing any uncollectable portion of the judgment 
assessed against a limited liability government entity by the total damages 
awarded, where the fault allocated to the government entity, when 
multiplied by the total dollar value of damages, exceeds the amount of 
judgment that can be awarded against the entity under state law. 
Rule 5: A subrogation interest is reduced by the 
percentage of comparative fault assessed against a non-
party not subject to the jurisdiction of Tennessee courts. 
A tort plaintiff cannot sue a tort defendant in Tennessee unless 
Tennessee courts have personal jurisdiction over that defendant.93 
Occasionally, Tennessee courts have personal jurisdiction over some, but 
not all, tort defendants. Under Tennessee’s comparative fault law, if the 
court does not have personal jurisdiction over a tortfeasor and a party 
defendant asserts fault against an out-of-state tortfeasor, a jury may 
apportion fault against the non-party out-of-state tortfeasor.94 Because the 
plaintiff cannot receive a judgment against a non-party out-of-state 
tortfeasor, however, the plaintiff once again bears the financial 
                                                 
 93. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(a)(6) (2013); State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco 
Trading Co., 403 S.W.3d 726 (Tenn. 2013). 
 94. See, e.g., Volz v. Ledes, 895 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. 1995). 
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consequences of such a fault allocation. This is demonstrated in the next 
hypothetical: 
Hypothetical 6—Reduction by Percentage of Fault 
Allocated to a Non-Party Not Subject to Suit in Tennessee 
A is hurt by the fault of B, a Tennessee resident. XYZ 
Insurance Company pays $50,000 in medical bills arising 
from the incident on A’s behalf. A files suit against B in 
Tennessee. B blames C, a non-resident of Tennessee, for 
contributing to cause A’s injuries. A adds C as a party 
defendant to his suit against B. C moves to dismiss, arguing 
that it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Tennessee 
courts. The trial judge agrees, and the suit against C is 
dismissed. The case is tried and B is found 90% at fault and 
non-party C is found 10% at fault. Under the Proposal, 
XYZ’s asserted subrogation interest is reduced by 10% 
because A’s only judgment is against B, and B is liable for 
only 90% of the damages. 
Once again, the subrogee stands in the shoes of its insured. A did 
not recover ten percent of his damages because fault was assessed against a 
party that A could not sue in Tennessee; thus, XYZ likewise cannot recover 
its full subrogation interest.95 
Rule 6: A subrogation interest is reduced by the 
percentage of the insured’s total damages that the insured 
is unable to collect from a tortfeasor. 
A fair subrogation model must adjust the subrogation interest to 
reflect the amount of damages actually collected by the plaintiff from a 
judgment or settlement. Partial recovery is far more likely than full 
recovery in many—if not most—instances of significant injury,96 so the 
subrogation interest must proportionately reflect the reality of the plaintiff’s 
actual collected compensation for the insured loss. The following illustrates 
the application of this Rule: 
                                                 
 95. True, if A files suit against C in C’s home state and recovers damages against C, 
then XYZ will recover more of its subrogation interest. However, A has no obligation to sue 
C, and, of course, XYZ can sue C in C’s home state and make a claim for medical expenses. 
In neither case would the result of the Tennessee state court action be admissible, much less 
binding, in the second suit. 
 96. Maher & Pathak, supra note 18, at 87 (citing Philip G. Peters, Jr., What We Know 
About Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1783, 1803 (2007) (describing data analysis 
of malpractice settlements as showing that “plaintiffs who receive a settlement are unlikely 
to recover the full amount of their damages”)). 
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Hypothetical 7—Reduction in Subrogation Interest for a 
Tortfeasor’s Inability to Pay Full Judgment 
A is hurt by the fault of B, a Tennessee resident. XYZ 
Insurance Company pays $50,000 in medical bills arising 
from the incident. A files suit against B. B has only 
$100,000 in liability insurance and obtains a bankruptcy 
discharge on any further obligation to A. The total value of 
A’s claim against B is determined to be $200,000. Under 
Rule 6, B’s inability to pay more than $100,000 means that 
A is deemed to have collected only fifty percent of each 
category of his damages, including his medical bills, and 
thus XYZ’s gross subrogation interest is reduced to 
$25,000. 
B. Principle 2—Accounting for Recovery Acquisition Costs 
The gross subrogation interest is reduced proportionately by the 
reasonable recovery acquisition costs that the insured paid to secure the 
tort recovery for his or her benefit and for the benefit of the subrogee. A 
subrogee is permitted to challenge the reasonableness of the asserted 
recovery acquisition costs but is not entitled to any discount for the amount 
it pays to its own counsel in the matter unless the court determines that the 
subrogee’s counsel materially participated in the proceedings. 
 
Principle 2 takes into account the insured’s expenses in bringing an 
action to recover from the responsible tortfeasor, a benefit enjoyed by both 
the insured and the subrogee.97 The pro rata sharing of these expenses 
between the insured and the subrogee is justified by the fact that but-for 
plaintiff’s bringing suit, there would be no recovery of the insured loss by 
the insurer. The rationale behind it is also well established in Tennessee;98 
the insurer would be unjustly enriched at its insured’s sole expense if the 
expenses were not so adjusted.99 Consider the following: 
                                                 
 97. This Rule can also be called the “there is no such thing as a free lunch Rule.” 
 98. For example, Tennessee recognizes the equitable common fund doctrine. See 
Kline v. Eyrich, 69 S.W.3d 197, 204 (Tenn. 2002) (citations omitted) (“[The common fund] 
doctrine is designed to spread attorneys’ fees among various beneficiaries to a fund, and it is 
supported by two primary rationales. First, the doctrine prevents the beneficiaries of legal 
services from being unjustly enriched by requiring them to pay for those services according 
to the benefit received. Second, the doctrine serves to spread the costs of litigation 
proportionally among all of the beneficiaries so that the plaintiff does not bear the entire 
burden alone. Indeed, in furtherance of this latter rationale, the doctrine may be applied 
irrespective of whether the other beneficiaries to the common fund actually receive the 
benefits of the common fund.”). 
 99. The decision by a subrogee to hire its own counsel is discussed infra Section 
IV(A). 
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Hypothetical 8—Reduction of Gross Subrogation Interest 
by Recovery Acquisition Costs to Find Net Subrogation 
Interest 
A is injured by B’s negligence. A’s health insurer, XZY 
Insurance Company, pays $50,000 in medical bills. A 
recovers all incurred medical expenses at trial, where B is 
found solely at fault. The total damages awarded are 
$300,000. A’s attorneys’ fees and expenses (recovery 
acquisition costs) are $100,000, an amount determined to 
be reasonable by the trial judge. B pays the entire 
judgment. XZY’s gross subrogation interest of $50,000 is 
reduced by the same proportion; i.e., by one-third, or 
$16,666.66. Thus, XZY receives $33,333.34 (its net 
subrogation interest). A paid her lawyer to recover the 
monies for XZY’s benefit and the amount of XZY’s 
subrogation interest is reduced accordingly. 
A subrogee has the right to employ a lawyer at its own expense to 
protect its interest, but doing so does not impair the right of the insured to 
have the subrogation interest reduced pro rata by the reasonable fees (and 
expenses) the insured paid his or her lawyer to secure the tort recovery, 
unless the subrogee’s lawyer made a material contribution to securing the 
subrogee’s recovery. Simply filing an intervening complaint or attending 
depositions would not constitute a “material contribution” to securing the 
funds. Current jurisprudence concerning fee allocation in connection with 
worker’s compensation subrogation interests provides an appropriate way 
to allocate fees under the Proposal.100 
                                                 
 100. See, e.g., Summers v. Command Sys. Inc., 867 S.W.2d 312, 315–16 (Tenn. 1993) 
(“Since both the employer and the employee have the right to recover against a third party 
tortfeasor, each has the right to be represented by its own counsel on such terms as the party 
and its lawyer shall agree. The employer may engage the employee’s lawyer to represent its 
interest also, on such terms as they, with the consent of the employee, shall agree. Even if 
separate counsel does not represent the employer, the employee’s lawyer is obligated to 
protect the employer’s interest. In that event, the employee’s lawyer shall be entitled to 
reasonable compensation for services rendered to the employee and the employer. The 
lawyer shall be compensated according to the terms of the employment contract between the 
lawyer and the employee, provided the trial court shall find that fee agreement to be 
reasonable. A contingent fee agreement between the employee and his lawyer will apply to 
the entire recovery, and the attorney’s fee will reduce the employer’s portion of the recovery 
by a pro rata amount. The lawyers who prosecute the tort action are entitled to receive a 
reasonable fee based on services rendered. Any dispute regarding the amount and 
apportionment of attorney fees shall be resolved by the trial court.”). 
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C. Principle 3—Maintaining Strict Segregation of Damages 
A subrogee does not have a right to collect a subrogation interest from 
monies awarded for any loss other than the loss that gave rise to the 
subrogation interest. 
 
An appropriate subrogation model must strictly segregate damages 
to preserve the integrity of the judgment or settlement as allocated. This 
means damages that were not attributed to the loss that gave rise to the 
insurer’s subrogation interest can never be used to satisfy the unrelated 
subrogation interest.101 This cross-collateralization of unrelated damages is 
endemic in a first-dollar contractual subrogation regime,102 but the problem 
also may arise under the “traditional” subrogation rule. The latter situation 
occurs where the plaintiff’s combined damages (i.e., medical expenses plus 
pain and suffering plus future earnings) make him whole and trigger the 
insurer’s subrogation right, which the insurer then exercises from any and 
all damages, including those not allocated to the loss related to the 
subrogation interest. Consider this hypothetical: 
Hypothetical 9—Segregation of Damages 
A is injured in a car accident caused solely by B. A incurs 
medical bills in treatment for injuries received in the car 
accident for which A’s insurer, XYZ Insurance Company, 
pays $75,000 and asserts a subrogation claim for that 
amount in A’s lawsuit against B. A receives a judgment of 
$25,000 for medical expenses and $50,000 for pain and 
suffering, and collects the entire judgment. Even though 
A’s combined payments from XYZ and B equal the total 
amount of his damages, i.e., A was “made whole,” the trier 
of fact only allocated $25,000 for medical bills. Should 
XYZ be permitted to dip into the damages allocated to A’s 
pain and suffering to satisfy its $75,000 subrogation 
interest? 
Application of Principle 3 answers that question in the negative and 
XYZ’s gross interest would be limited to $25,000. The problem with 
allowing XYZ to collect from A’s pain and suffering award is that those 
damages were allocated to a loss unrelated to the medical bills XYZ paid on 
A’s behalf, and thus are unrelated to XYZ’s subrogation interest. Under any 
                                                 
 101. For example, pain and suffering damages cannot be used to satisfy the insurer’s 
subrogation interest from a loss it incurred paying medical expenses on the insured’s behalf. 
 102. First-dollar contractual subrogation models, as the name implies and depending on 
the terms of the policy, are unlikely to distinguish between different categories of damages 
from which the insurer may collect its subrogation interest. 
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reasonable model, XYZ’s gross subrogation interest here should be reduced 
to $25,000 because the trier of fact allocated only that amount to 
compensate the relevant loss, i.e., the medical bills. This strict segregation 
of damages as allocated is crucial to a workable subrogation regime and is 
fundamental to the very premise of the subrogation right itself. 
D. Principle 4—Preventing Collusive Settlements 
No out-of-court effort by the insured or a tortfeasor to allocate fault, 
determine insured’s damages, or allocate damages among several plaintiffs 
shall be binding on the subrogee absent consent of the subrogee. 
 
As a natural consequence of a strict segregated damages rule, the 
law must also prohibit and keep in check arbitrary or collusive allocations 
of damages in settlements as well as bad faith litigation tactics aimed solely 
at defeating subrogation interests.103 For example, it is always possible that 
an insured and a tortfeasor will try to allocate money in a settlement 
between the insured and, say, the insured’s spouse, in a way that would 
attempt to defeat a subrogation interest. The following example illustrates 
this situation: 
Hypothetical 10—Collusive Allocation of Damages in 
Settlement 
A is hurt in a car wreck. A and his spouse, B, assert claims 
against tort defendant C. A has $20,000 in medical 
expenses which are paid by his health insurer, XYZ 
Insurance Company. A’s case has a value of $90,000. B 
asserts a loss of consortium claim. XYZ asserts its 
subrogation interest in A’s recovery. C has only $100,000 
in liability insurance coverage and cannot reasonably be 
expected to pay an excess judgment or contribute to a 
settlement from his own assets. A and B enter into a 
settlement with C allocating $50,000 of the insurance 
proceeds to A and $50,000 to B for the loss of consortium 
claim. XYZ does not participate in negotiation of tort 
settlement. XYZ can challenge the allocation of the monies 
that are allocated between A and B as being unreasonable. 
A retains the burden of proving that the settlement of his 
                                                 
 103. One might imagine a situation in which the parties to a settlement agree to 
categorize all damages as pain and suffering to circumvent a subrogation interest in a 
medical expenses loss, or a plaintiff in litigation decides for strategic reasons (or in bad 
faith) to not prove damages related to subrogation interest, either because the damages are 
not worth it or are overshadowed by plaintiff’s other damages. Under the Proposal, the trial 
court would make a determination as to the parties’ conduct at the subrogation hearing 
phase. 
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claim for $50,000 was reasonable under the circumstances, 
which necessarily implicates the value of the loss of 
consortium claim. 
In summary, insureds and tort defendants should not be able to 
collude so as to inflate the value of a tort case, allocate money between 
multiple plaintiffs unreasonably, or otherwise work to defeat a subrogation 
interest. The settling insured will always bear the burden of establishing the 
reasonableness of the settlement with the tortfeasor where the subrogee’s 
consent to the settlement amount was not obtained, and the subrogee will 
not be bound by damage allocations or valuations the insured reached with 
the tortfeasor without its participation.104 
For example, in Hunley v. Silver Furniture Mfg. Co., the Tennessee 
Supreme Court provided a workable framework for ensuring that an 
allocation of damages in settlements involving third-party claims arising 
from on-the-job injuries is fair and reasonable where a subrogation right is 
implicated.105 In essence, this decision permits a court to hear evidence on 
the matter and determine whether the allocation of damages was 
reasonable.106 The subrogee should be given notice of any such hearing and 
the opportunity to be heard. This concept is incorporated in the Modified 
Made-Whole Doctrine Proposal. 
                                                 
 104. Of course, if the case is tried and the subrogee has notice of the trial and an 
opportunity to intervene and be heard at the trial, it will be bound by such allocations and 
determinations. This is discussed in more detail infra Section IV(A)(2). 
 105. See Hunley v. Silver Furniture Mfg. Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Tenn. 2001). 
Hunley involved a dispute over whether an employer’s statutory right to subrogation under 
the workers’ compensation statute extended to the loss of consortium claim and settlement 
against a third party tortfeasor brought by an employee’s spouse. Id. The Court held that the 
spouse’s settlement was not subject to subrogation, and added that 
[w]hen presented with a motion to approve a settlement between a third-
party tortfeasor and the worker and the worker’s spouse, the trial court 
having jurisdiction over the third-party claim shall review the settlement 
to ensure that the allocation of settlement proceeds between the worker 
and the worker’s spouse is fair and reasonable. The court should 
consider both the need to protect the statutory subrogation rights of the 
employer and the need to encourage good faith settlement of third-party 
claims. In determining the reasonableness of the allocation of the total 
damages, the trial court should consider ‘the nature and extent of the 
claimed loss of consortium, the potential value of the dismissed claim, 
and the expectations and motivations of the settling parties.’ If any 
portion of the settlement allocated for loss of consortium damages is 
determined not to be fair and reasonable, that portion shall be made 
subject to subrogation in favor of the employer. 
 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Rains v. Kolberg Mfg. Corp., 897 P.2d 845, 848 (Colo. App. 
1994)). 
 106. Id. 
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E. Principle 5—Guidelines for Settlement 
An insured and a tortfeasor may settle a tort claim for an amount equal to 
or more than the entire asserted subrogation interest without the 
permission of the subrogee. However, if the subrogee later challenges the 
reasonableness of that settlement, the insured will bear the duty of 
demonstrating that the settlement was reasonable. An insured and a 
tortfeasor may not settle a tort claim for an amount less than an asserted 
subrogation interest without the permission of a subrogee or the court 
(after notice to the subrogee). 
 
Principle 5 is difficult to discuss in isolation because it overlaps 
significantly with the other Principles and raises many of the complicated 
procedural questions inherent to the Proposal. Indeed, Principle 5 attempts 
to answer one of the most difficult questions arising in a legal system that 
both encourages the prompt settlement of tort claims but must also consider 
the implications of that policy on other stakeholders to the claim, i.e., 
subrogees. Thus, a discussion of Principle 5 will be included in the last 
sections of this Article. 
PART IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSAL 
The first question raised by any practicing attorney encountering 
changes in the law such as those the Proposal envisions is, “What does it 
look like on the ground?” The last Section of this Article attempts to answer 
that question because a workable model for the equitable resolution of 
subrogation claims must include a description of procedures that can be 
used by litigants and courts to resolve subrogation disputes. Thus, what 
follows is a detailed discussion of how subrogation issues are resolved 
before a tort suit is filed, while a tort suit is pending, after the tort suit is 
tried, and the resolution of subrogation issues after settlement with one of 
multiple tortfeasors. As mentioned above, these discussions involve the 
application of all of the Principles, including Principle 5. 
A. Pre-Suit Resolution of Tort Subrogation Claims 
In pre-suit settlement negotiations involving subrogation interests, 
both the insured and the subrogee should consider the factors in the 
Proposal in resolving their dispute. Because the vast majority of 
subrogation disputes will be resolved during this stage of the proceedings, a 
well-defined body of substantive law that clearly articulates the method for 
determining the amount of a subrogation interest is necessary not only to 
facilitate but also to promote such settlements.107 
                                                 
 107. Indeed, it is the author’s experience that many of these same factors are being used 
informally today as subrogees and insureds attempt to resolve subrogation issues. 
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Where a subrogation interest is asserted in a tort claim and the 
insured settles the claim against the tortfeasor108 without filing a lawsuit, 
one of two things will happen: (1) the insured will simultaneously settle the 
subrogation claim with the subrogee and no lawsuit of any type will be 
filed; or (2) the insured and the subrogee will be unable to resolve their 
dispute and one or the other will file a lawsuit to permit a court to 
adjudicate the subrogation dispute.109 
1. Tort Case Settles; Subrogation Issues Resolved Without Litigation 
There will frequently be simultaneous negotiations between the 
tortfeasor, the insured, and the subrogee in an effort to reach a global 
resolution of the matters in dispute. In an ideal world, this would happen in 
every case and all matters would be resolved without the need to resort to 
litigation. That being said, the tort plaintiff and the tort defendant have a 
right to compromise and settle their tort dispute without negotiating a 
resolution of the subrogation interest if the total amount of the settlement 
exceeds the asserted subrogation interest. 
The tort defendant will not ordinarily permit a resolution of the 
underlying tort case that leaves open the possibility of further financial 
liability to the subrogee on the subrogation claim.110 Thus, the tortfeasor 
will ordinarily require that monies representing the total claimed 
subrogation interest (or the entire amount of the settlement, whichever is 
less) either be held in trust by plaintiff’s counsel or deposited with the 
court, pending resolution of the subrogation claim. This protects the 
tortfeasor and the subrogee. The tortfeasor has “bought his peace” because 
the subrogee’s rights in the tort case have been protected.111 
                                                 
 108. The tortfeasor will ordinarily be represented by an attorney selected by and paid 
for by a liability insurance carrier. Thus, the use of the term “tortfeasor” includes a reference 
to the alleged wrongdoer and the alleged wrongdoer’s liability insurance company. 
 109. If the subrogee files suit first, it will bring a claim for breach of the insurance 
contract. If the insured files suit first, it will be seeking a declaratory judgment of the 
amount, if any, of the subrogation interest. A suit by the insured for a declaratory judgment 
will be met by the subrogee’s counterclaim for breach of contract. 
 110. It is possible for the defendant to undertake responsibility for the entire 
subrogation claim and agree to indemnify and hold the insured harmless for any liability 
under the claim. This would relieve the insured of any responsibility to satisfy the 
subrogation interest, assuming, of course, that the defendant had the financial ability to pay 
the subrogation interest. 
 111. This is why Principle 5 allows a tortfeasor and an insured to settle a case for an 
amount equal to or more than the claimed subrogation interest without seeking the 
subrogee’s prior approval. The tortfeasor’s economic interest protects the subrogee. This is 
not true when the amount of the proposed settlement is less than the subrogee’s claimed 
subrogation interest, demonstrating why Principle 5 requires permission of the subrogee or 
court order under such facts. 
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2. Tort Case Settles; Subrogation Issues Litigated 
Assuming that the tortfeasor and the insured reach a resolution of 
the tort claim but the insured and the subrogee cannot resolve the 
subrogation issue, a lawsuit will be necessary to resolve the issue. 
Regardless of who files suit, the subrogee will have the burden of proving 
(a) that it has a subrogation right in the insured’s recovery from the 
tortfeasor; (b) the amount of its interest in the insured’s recovery (the 
“asserted subrogation interest”); and (c) that the expenses it paid for the loss 
on behalf of its insured were reasonable, necessary, and arose from the 
injuries for which recovery was made in the underlying settlement.112 
The insured will have the burden of proving the reasonableness of 
any settlement with the tortfeasor. To do so, the insured will have to (a) 
demonstrate the value of the tort claim; (b) articulate why the settlement is 
reasonable notwithstanding the fact that it was for less than the asserted 
value of the case; and (c) prove which of the factors in the Proposal work to 
reduce the amount of money the subrogee can recover. 
The insured will also have to prove the monies paid (or to be paid) 
for legal services in securing the settlement with the tortfeasor (the 
“recovery acquisition cost”) and ask the court to reduce the subrogation 
interest accordingly. Likewise, if the subrogee asserts that it materially 
participated in obtaining the settlement and thus should not suffer a 
reduction in its subrogation interest based on the insured’s full recovery 
acquisition costs, the subrogee must produce evidence to support that 
assertion and ask the court to take the subrogee’s participation into 
consideration in adjusting the subrogation interest. 
An insured can avoid the burden of proving that the settlement with 
a tortfeasor was reasonable by obtaining the subrogee’s consent to the 
settlement. An insured who settles a personal injury claim without 
obtaining consent of the subrogee or settling the subrogation claim at the 
same time assumes the risk that the subrogee will later argue that the 
amount of the settlement was unreasonable, thereby complicating the later 
subrogation trial and leaving the insured at risk that the settlement will be 
deemed unreasonable. Thus, a global resolution of the tort claim and the 
subrogation claim is ordinarily preferable. At a minimum, an effort often 
would be made to obtain the subrogee’s consent to the settlement reached 
with the tortfeasor. 
                                                 
 112. The language here assumes that the subrogation interest arises from the payment 
of medical expenses paid under a health insurance policy or the medical payments provision 
of an automobile insurance policy. If the asserted subrogation interest arose out of a different 
type of policy, the exact proof requirements would vary accordingly. 
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i. Demonstrating That the Tort Settlement Was Reasonable 
Whether a settlement of the underlying tort action is reasonable 
should depend on the strength of the liability case against the settling 
tortfeasor, the likely value of the case in the absence of liability issues, the 
readily available financial resources of the settling defendant, the financial 
situation of the plaintiff, the expense of continued litigation, the presence or 
absence of other tortfeasors, the presence or absence of law that immunizes 
the defendant or others in whole or in part, and other relevant factors. 
A settlement is not necessarily reasonable simply because it secures 
100% of the liability insurance proceeds available to indemnify a tortfeasor. 
A tortfeasor is, or at least should be, responsible for the harm caused by its 
conduct. Financial responsibility is not limited by the amount of liability 
insurance available to indemnify the tortfeasor for that loss. So, as part of 
the insured’s obligation to prove whether a settlement made without the 
subrogee’s consent was reasonable despite the fact that it was materially 
less than the asserted value of the tort claim, the insured must also 
demonstrate financial resources of the tort defendant that were readily 
available to meaningfully contribute to a settlement or pay a judgment in 
the case. This evidence will help the court determine whether the settlement 
reached was reasonable under the circumstances. 
“Readily available financial resources” refers to that part of the 
tortfeasor’s assets and present and future income reasonably available to 
either satisfy a judgment entered in the tort case if the case was tried to a 
conclusion or to make a meaningful contribution to a settlement of the 
claim. To determine the amount of readily available financial resources, one 
should look not only to the liability insurance applicable to the tort event 
but also the assets, liabilities, and income stream, both current and 
foreseeable, of the tortfeasor.113 One should also look to the likelihood that 
the tort defendant could avoid a judgment in excess of the liability 
insurance policy limits through discharge after a bankruptcy proceeding. If 
bankruptcy is not an option because of the nature of the underlying tort, that 
too should be considered. Also to be considered is the ability of the tort 
defendant to make a meaningful contribution to payment of an excess 
judgment in a reasonable period of time after such a judgment would likely 
be entered, evaluated against the cost of collection efforts and the time 
value of money. Finally, one should consider any allegation that a liability 
insurance policy does not provide coverage for the incident in question and 
weigh the merits of that coverage defense. 
                                                 
 113. An insured’s lawyer may insist that the tortfeasor provide an affidavit that 
addresses the tortfeasor’s net worth, income, and more. Ordinarily, the insured should have a 
right to rely on such an affidavit when deciding whether or not to settle a claim. In the event 
that it is later determined that the tortfeasor gave a materially false affidavit, the underlying 
settlement should be declared void and the tortfeasor once again should be subject to 
personal liability. 
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However, “readily available financial resources” should not include 
the chance that the tortfeasor could win the lottery and be able to pay the 
judgment, or other similar speculation. An appropriate inquiry would 
include a potential inheritance, but only rarely would such an inquiry result 
in a determination that, other things being equal, the tortfeasor should be 
required to make an additional contribution to the settlement for the 
settlement to be reasonable.114 
A “meaningful contribution” to settlement of the tort claim is a 
potential or actual payment, in addition to liability insurance monies, by a 
tortfeasor to the insured of an amount of money or other asset that is not a 
de minimis amount given the value of the tort claim. The determination of 
whether the insured should require a tortfeasor to make a personal financial 
contribution to the settlement of a tort claim, as well as the amount of such 
a contribution, turns on the application of a “reasonable person” test: After 
taking into consideration the tortfeasor’s readily available financial 
resources and the circumstances surrounding the tender of the liability 
insurance in the tort case, would a reasonably prudent person in the position 
of the insured require the tortfeasor to make a personal financial 
contribution to the settlement of the tort case, and if so, in what amount? 
To answer this question, one must make a reasonable investigation 
of a tort defendant’s ability to pay an excess judgment or make a 
meaningful contribution to the tort settlement.115 That is, one must 
undertake the degree of effort that would be undertaken by a reasonably 
prudent person under the circumstances to learn the assets, liabilities, and 
income stream of the tortfeasor. The following series of hypotheticals 
explore these concepts. 
Hypothetical 11—Settlement Reasonable; Insolvent 
Defendant 
A is injured by B. B is solely and undeniably at fault. A’s 
health insurer, XYZ, pays $50,000 in medical bills treating 
                                                 
 114. A claim that the tortfeasor might inherit someday from his sixty-year-old mother 
(who enjoys excellent health) would bear little weight. If the tortfeasor and spouse owned a 
mortgage-free home as tenants by the entirety, evidence demonstrating that the spouse was 
suffering from metastatic cancer for which no treatment was available (and thus the 
tortfeasor would likely own the home free and clear in the near future) would bear more 
weight. 
 115. The phrase “meaningful contribution to the tort settlement” is undeniably vague 
but, in the author’s view, appropriately descriptive. Rarely will a liability insurer be willing 
to pay 100% of the true value of the claim. Rarely will a tort defendant be able or willing to 
make a contribution to a tort settlement that, when added to the monies paid by the liability 
insurer, is 100% of the true value of the claim. Thus, the phrase “meaningful contribution to 
the tort settlement” is used to permit the parties and, ultimately, the fact-finder to determine 
if the overall settlement was reasonable without forcing the plaintiff to extract—or the 
individual defendant to pay—some immaterial amount just to satisfy the desires of the 
subrogee. 
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injuries caused by B. B has liability insurance of $50,000. 
A’s claim is likely worth $200,000 but has not been 
reduced to judgment because no suit has been filed. A 
receives an affidavit from B that B does not own a home, 
has less than $10,000 in personal property items, and earns 
minimum wage. B has the right to bankrupt any judgment 
entered in litigation with A. Under the circumstances, a 
settlement with B’s liability insurer for $50,000 is 
reasonable. 
Hypothetical 12—Settlement Unreasonable; Defendant Has 
Personal Assets Beyond Liability Policy 
A is injured by B. B is solely and undeniably at fault. A’s 
health insurer, XYZ, pays $50,000 in medical bills treating 
injuries caused by B. B has liability insurance of $50,000. 
A’s claim is likely worth $200,000 but has not been 
reduced to judgment and no suit has been filed. 
Investigation reveals that B owns in his own name a home 
worth $250,000 subject to a mortgage of $100,000 and 
earns $80,000 per year. B has no other debt. 
Notwithstanding his injuries, A is able to meet his financial 
obligations in the same manner as he was before the 
incident. A settlement with the liability insurer for the 
$50,000 insurance policy limits would be unreasonable 
because B has the capability of making a meaningful 
contribution to the tort settlement. The amount of that 
contribution would depend on consideration of additional 
factors. 
Hypothetical 13—Settlement Reasonable; Insolvent 
Corporate Defendant 
A is injured by B who at the time of the incident was 
working in the course and scope of his employment with 
Corporation. Liability is admitted. B has filed bankruptcy 
and his obligation to A is discharged. Corporation’s 
liability insurance is adequate to pay only 20% of the value 
of the claim. An affidavit from the sole owner of 
Corporation reveals that Corporation has no real property 
and its desks, chairs, and computers are worth less than 
$10,000. Accounts payable exceed accounts receivable. 
The owner has indicated that if A files a lawsuit against the 
Corporation, he will cause the Corporation to file 
bankruptcy and he will move to Alaska and become a 
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fishing guide. A settlement with the liability insurer for the 
insurance policy limits would be reasonable. 
Hypothetical 14—Settlement Unreasonable 
A is injured by B who at the time of the incident was 
working in the course and scope of his employment with 
Corporation. Liability is admitted. B has filed bankruptcy 
and his obligation to A is discharged. Corporation’s 
liability insurance is adequate to pay only 20% of the value 
of the claim. The owner of the corporation refuses to 
cooperate when requested to reveal Corporation’s balance 
statement, income statement, and tax returns. Publically 
available research reveals that Corporation owns and 
operates a manufacturing plant with thirty-two employees 
and has doubled its workforce in the past six months. 
Notwithstanding his injuries, A is able to meet his financial 
obligations in the same manner as he was before the 
incident. A settlement with the liability insurer for the 
insurance policy limits would be unreasonable because (1) 
Corporation refuses to reveal information that would 
permit the reasonably prudent person to evaluate whether 
Corporation can make a meaningful contribution to a 
settlement and (2) there is some evidence that Corporation 
is a going, growing concern with some ability to pay. 
Notably, the fact that a settlement with a tortfeasor is unreasonable 
does not always entitle the subrogee to 100% of the insured’s settlement 
proceeds. Rather, the subrogee would have to prove what a reasonable 
settlement figure in the case would have been. If the subrogee meets this 
burden, the calculation of the subrogation interest is to be based on that 
figure. 
Hypothetical 15—Unreasonable Settlement; Subsequent 
Modification of Subrogation Interest by the Court 
A is injured by B. B is solely and undeniably at fault. A’s 
health insurer pays $50,000 in medical bills treating 
injuries caused by B. B has liability insurance of $50,000. 
A’s claim is likely worth $200,000 but has not been 
reduced to judgment and no suit has been filed. 
Investigation reveals that B owns in his own name a home 
worth $250,000 subject to a mortgage of $100,000 and 
earns $80,000 per year. A is able to meet his financial 
obligations in the same manner as he was before the 
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incident. A fails to persuade the court that the settlement for 
the $50,000 liability insurance policy limit is a reasonable 
settlement. The subrogee persuades the judge that B should 
have made an additional $50,000 personal contribution to 
the settlement. Thus, for purposes of determining the extent 
of the subrogee’s gross subrogation interest, the court 
should assume that the amount of the settlement was 
$100,000 rather than $50,000. 
Many will find this result disturbing because it permits a subrogee 
(and a trial judge) to second-guess a settlement presumably made in good 
faith. That may be true, but equity requires that a subrogee not be burdened 
by the financial consequences of a settlement it played no part in reaching. 
Thus, the reasonably prudent plaintiff’s lawyer will engage the subrogee in 
settlement negotiations as they are occurring with the tortfeasor, 
particularly if there is evidence that the tortfeasor has some assets or a 
middle-class or higher income stream.116 Why? Because the failure to do so 
will open the door to second-guessing by both the subrogee and a court, 
thus potentially impacting the insured’s net recovery and delaying the 
complete resolution of the dispute. 
Therefore, the insured’s lawyer has an incentive to make an effort 
to persuade the subrogee to accept the compromise tentatively reached with 
the tortfeasor117 or, at a minimum, force the subrogee to articulate its 
reasons for objecting to the settlement so that the merit—or lack thereof—
of those reasons can be taken into account in determining whether to settle 
the case without the subrogee’s consent. A reasonably prudent subrogee 
will also engage in such negotiations, knowing that the failure to reach a 
compromise will result in additional litigation and related expense that may 
yield little or no additional payments to it. 
ii. Other Factors Impacting Reasonableness of Settlements in Tort Actions 
Three other points that reflect the economic realities of settlements 
must be made on this subject. First, whether a settlement with the tortfeasor 
was reasonable should not depend on the insured’s obtaining the full limit 
of the tortfeasor’s liability policy. Liability considerations may weigh in 
favor of a resolution that constitutes less than liability insurance policy 
limits. Likewise, the tortfeasor’s liability insurer may insist that it must 
                                                 
 116. The financial circumstances of the plaintiff may compel a resolution of the case 
before an agreement can be reached with the subrogee. 
 117. Counsel for the insured could engage the subrogee in the negotiations with the 
tortfeasor or reach an agreement with the tortfeasor subject to later approval by the subrogee. 
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“save a little” and that the tort defendant is able to make a meaningful 
contribution to the settlement.118 
Second, the economic situation of the plaintiff may require a 
settlement for less than what would otherwise be a reasonable settlement. 
Fundamental fairness requires that this reality be considered. Every case 
has a value, but no reasonable lawyer fails to take into account the 
economic needs of his or her own client when evaluating a case for 
settlement. However, the mere declaration by an insured that “I needed the 
money” should not be given any weight in determining the reasonableness 
of a settlement. Rather, the insured must be able to demonstrate that a 
degree of financial need existed at the time of the settlement such that any 
reasonable person, similarly situated, would place weight on that need in 
settling the case. As a matter of public policy, a subrogee should be bound 
by the legitimate economic need of its insured: Once again, it stands in the 
insured’s shoes. 
Third, it is not in the interest of tortfeasors, the legal system, or 
society to force every tortfeasor into bankruptcy simply to prove that a tort 
settlement was reasonable. The Proposal acknowledges that policy interest 
and provides a fluid but workable method for resolving the issue. The 
notion that an insured must litigate an injury case until the tortfeasor seeks 
and receives a bankruptcy discharge before the insured can seek a reduction 
in a subrogation interest should be immediately rejected. 
One can readily see some challenging and unusual issues in a trial 
over the proper amount of a subrogation interest.119 Depending on the 
nature of the injury and other factors, the plaintiff may contest whether 
some of the medical expenses were reasonable, necessary, or related to the 
injuries received in the incident. One can also imagine a situation in which 
an insured tries to increase his or her own fault or increase the fault 
allocated to a non-party. Indeed, the insured arguably has no incentive to 
actively work to diminish his or her fault—or decrease the fault allocation 
to judgment-proof parties or immune non-parties—in situations where the 
                                                 
 118. Because liability insurers in Tennessee face no real threat of a “bad faith” action 
against them by their insureds and they have no legally enforceable duty to deal with 
plaintiffs in good faith, it is not uncommon for liability insurance adjusters to insist upon 
some discount from policy limits to settle a case, even if liability is clear and the damages 
clearly exceed the policy limits. This is a fact of tort litigation in Tennessee. It would be 
unfair to not take this reality into account in establishing an equitable model for approaching 
the resolution of subrogation interests. 
 119. The author is aware of nothing that would prohibit either party from demanding a 
jury trial in a case between a tort plaintiff and subrogee. To be sure, even in a jury trial some 
issues would be solely for the court (e.g., whether governmental immunity barred a claim by 
plaintiff, whether a statute of repose had expired under facts not in dispute, etc. See DAY ET 
AL., supra note 79, §§ 5:16–17), but there are issues to be resolved that are traditionally 
resolved by juries (such as the relative degree of fault of the parties, compensatory damages, 
etc.). Presumably, however, neither party would demand a jury in the vast majority of such 
cases given the higher costs of preparing cases for trial by jury, the additional time it takes to 
try a jury case, and other factors. 
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damages sought are subject to a subrogation interest.120 That being said, a 
fact-finder will quickly see through any effort by an insured to unfairly 
diminish a subrogation interest. 
Finally, in the event of a subrogation trial where the facts are 
resolved by a judge, the judge should issue findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. The ruling should address whether a subrogation right exists and the 
gross amount of any subrogation interest. It should then determine whether 
any settlement entered into by the insured was reasonable and what, if any, 
factors apply to reduce the gross subrogation interest. The court should also 
determine the reasonableness of any recovery acquisition costs asserted. If 
any subrogation interest is present, judgment should be entered for the 
subrogee in that amount, and any funds held in trust or by the court should 
be released in accordance with the judgment. 
iii. Protections for the Subrogee When the Tort Case Is Settled 
Principle 5 makes it clear that a tort defendant and an insured 
cannot settle a claim for less than the amount of the claimed subrogation 
interest without the consent of the subrogee or permission of the court. 
Principle 5 is added for completeness, but is of little practical effect because 
tortfeasors, or at least their insurers, know that they cannot avoid liability 
on a subrogation claim without getting a release from the subrogee.121 Thus, 
tortfeasors and their insurers typically will not settle a tort claim without 
making some effort to shift the subrogation exposure to the insured and 
ensuring that the money to pay the subrogee’s claim is preserved until the 
claim is resolved. 
That being said, a tort defendant and an insured, after notice to a 
subrogee, may petition the court for approval of a settlement for an amount 
less than the subrogation interest, which will require a proceeding in which 
the Proposal is applied to determine whether the settlement is reasonable 
and, if so, the net amount of the subrogation interest. 
B. Settlement of the Tort Claim After the Insured Has Filed Suit 
Against the Tortfeasor 
Some tort cases are filed before there are any settlement 
negotiations and others are filed after a breakdown of negotiations. If suit is 
filed in the underlying tort action, the subrogee can elect to intervene in the 
case and work with the plaintiff to secure a recovery. Alternatively, the 
subrogee can elect not to intervene. If the subrogee does not intervene, it 
loses its right to contest the trial results in the underlying case, including, 
                                                 
 120. For a similar example, see supra Section III(D). 
 121. See supra Section III(D). 
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but not limited to, the fault allocation by the fact-finder and the fact-finder’s 
valuation of the plaintiff’s claim.122 
On the other hand, most personal injury and wrongful death cases 
are settled before trial. In these cases, whether the subrogee chooses to 
intervene or not, there frequently will be settlement discussions with the 
goal of resolving the case at some point in the litigation process. The 
procedures and factors to consider in settling a subrogation claim while a 
tort case is pending are identical to those applicable to settling a tort claim 
before suit is filed.123 
In the interest of judicial economy, efforts should be made to 
enable the same court hearing the tort case to resolve any subrogation 
dispute and to preserve the available record. If a settlement is reached in the 
tort case but not in the subrogation dispute and a subrogation trial becomes 
necessary, the subrogee, if it has not already done so, should intervene in 
the pending case. If the underlying tort case is dismissed before the 
subrogee intervenes, a separate suit must be filed to have a court resolve the 
issue. Again, either the insured or the subrogee can file suit. If a trial is 
necessary, the procedures described in Section C below should be followed. 
C. Resolution of Subrogation Claims After a Court or Jury Decides the 
Case 
As indicated above, if suit is filed in the underlying tort action, the 
subrogee can elect to intervene in the case and work with the plaintiff to 
secure a recovery. Alternatively, the subrogee can elect not to intervene and 
allow the trial to take place without its involvement. 
A determination by a jury124 of the value of a tort case always sets 
the value of the case for purposes of calculating a subrogation interest. 
Thus, after a trial an insured cannot argue that his or her claim is worth 
“more” than the jury determined, and a subrogee cannot argue that the 
claim was worth less. The value of the claim is binding absent a remittitur, 
additur, or a court-ordered new trial.125 
                                                 
 122. See Abbott v. Blount Cnty., 207 S.W.3d 732, 736 (Tenn. 2006) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Bill Brown Constr. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 818 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tenn. 1991) 
(“[I]t is the long-standing rule in Tennessee that any contractual provision of a policy of 
insurance, whether part of an insuring, exclusionary, or forfeiture clause, may be waived by 
the acts, representations, or knowledge of the insurer’s agent. Under this principle, an insurer 
may not fail to act and then seek to enforce exclusionary terms of a policy. It follows that if 
[subrogee] had knowledge of [insured’s] lawsuit and settlement negotiations but did not 
intervene or warn the insured that [subrogee’s] subrogation rights could affect the [insured’s] 
recovery, then [subrogee] will be deemed to have waived those rights.”)). 
 123. This subject is addressed in Section IV(A). 
 124. Of course, if neither party demands a jury, the fact-finder in the case will be the 
judge. 
 125. This assumes the subrogee has notice of the litigation and trial and an opportunity 
to participate. If for some reason the subrogee receives no notice, it should be not be bound 
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Likewise, a party to a tort dispute resolved at a trial (or one who 
had the opportunity to be a party but declined) cannot later take issue with 
the fault apportionment, damages allocation, legal rulings by the judge 
regarding statutes of repose or other immunity issues, or other factors that 
impact the amount of the subrogation claim as set forth in the Proposal.126 
In other words, if there is a trial of the tort case and the subrogee had the 
right to participate in it, at the close of the trial all issues in the case relevant 
to the subrogation issue will be resolved except (a) whether a right to 
subrogation exists at all, and (b) the amount of the net subrogation interest 
after consideration of the factors set forth in the Proposal. 
Thus, after a trial of the tort case, if there is no dispute about the 
right to subrogation or the gross amount of the subrogation interest, the trial 
judge simply applies the factors in the Proposal to determine the payable 
subrogation interest. The following hypotheticals illustrate how the 
Proposal might be applied in practice: 
Hypothetical 16—Application of the Proposal 
A is injured because of the fault of B and City. The case is 
tried. XYZ Insurance Company paid A’s medical bills, is 
given timely notice of the tort trial, and intervenes to assert 
its subrogation interest for $100,000 in medical bills it paid 
on A’s behalf. The jury awards $1 million in total damages 
($100,000 of which are allocated to A’s medical expenses, 
i.e., the full amount of XYZ’s asserted subrogation 
interest), and determines that A is 20% at fault, B is 40% at 
fault and City is 40% at fault. Because City’s liability is 
capped by statute at $300,000, A’s gross recovery from 
both B and City can be no more than $700,000; $400,000 
of which is to be paid by B and $300,000 of which is to be 
paid by City. No appeal will be taken in the case. 
In a post-trial hearing, before judgment is entered against B and 
City, the judge must determine XYZ’s net subrogation interest. Under the 
Proposal, the amount will be determined as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                 
by the results reached in that trial. If the subrogee receives late notice of the litigation or trial 
and wants to participate in the trial, it should promptly move to intervene to protect its rights. 
 126. This is not to say that there cannot be an appeal of the legal rulings and findings of 
fact. Rather, a party to the proceedings (or those who elected not to be parties) cannot make 
a collateral attack on the results in the trial during the post-trial proceedings to determine the 
subrogation interest. 
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XYZ’s asserted subrogation interest $100,000 
Reduction: 20% for A’s fault ($20,000) 
Reduction: 10% for City’s liability cap (percentage derived by 
(i) subtracting the amount of City’s liability limit ($300,000) 
from the total amount of damages assessed against City 
($400,000) and (ii) dividing that amount ($100,000) by the total 
amount of damages awarded ($1,000,000) 
($10,000) 
Gross subrogation interest before court’s adjustment for 
recovery acquisition costs 
$70,000 
Reduction: 40% for A’s recovery acquisition costs for the 
insured loss (assuming the court finds this percentage 
reasonable based on insured’s one-third contingent attorney’s 
fee plus pro rata litigation costs)  
($28,000) 
Net subrogation amount $42,000 
 
Once the net subrogation amount is determined, the judge must 
next enter a separate judgment against each defendant that allocates 
responsibility for the payment of the net subrogation amount according to 
the fault assessed against each defendant. Here, B is charged with $400,000 
of A’s total recoverable damages of $700,000 (four-sevenths) and City is 
charged with $300,000 of A’s total recoverable damages of $700,000 
(three-sevenths). Thus, XYZ is entitled to recover four-sevenths of the net 
subrogation amount from B and three-sevenths of the net subrogation 
amount from City. Stated differently, the judgment of the trial court should 
require B to pay $24,000 directly to XYZ, and should require City to pay 
$18,000 directly to XYZ.127 Assuming both judgments are fully collectable, 
XYZ will recover its entire $42,000 net subrogation amount. 
                                                 
 127. The reader may ask why separate judgments are entered for the tort plaintiff and 
the subrogee. The rationale is that both tort plaintiff and subrogee made the decision to file 
suit and go to trial, and thus it is appropriate that each should have separate judgments 
against the tortfeasors. However, this presents the problem of whether the insured or the 
subrogee has priority to collect their respective damages from the tortfeasor, especially in 
situations where the tortfeasor is unlikely to be able to pay the full amount of the judgment. 
While it would be inimical to deem one court-issued judgment subordinate to the other, the 
subrogee in most cases presumably will have more resources with which to collect its 
damages from the tortfeasor, leaving the tort victim at a disadvantage in the collection phase. 
The alternative, however, is most likely a consolidated judgment for the tort victim, who 
would then bear the burden of collecting from the tortfeasor alone, remitting payment of the 
subrogation interest to the subrogee as monies are recovered. What should happen is that the 
insured and the subrogee join forces to collect the judgment and bear the expense of the 
same pro rata. 
  However, it should be noted that the separate judgment model only makes sense in 
the context of a subrogation right, and not where a right of reimbursement forms the basis of 
the insurer’s claim to a subrogation interest. This is because a subrogation right in essence 
gives the subrogee standing to assert its claim directly against the tortfeasor, whereas a right 
of reimbursement only gives rise to a cause of action by the insurer against its insured. In the 
latter instance, it seems like the court would be obligated to enter a judgment for the plaintiff 
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To complete the picture, the judgments entered in favor of the tort 
plaintiff (after deducting the amount due to the subrogee) would look like 
this: 
A’s Judgment Against B: $400,000 - $24,000 = $376,000 
A’s Judgment Against City: $300,000 - $18,000 = $282,000 
One post-trial issue that may arise is the proper amount of the 
subrogation interest in the event the damage award allocated by the fact-
finder to the insured’s loss—usually medical expenses—is less than the 
claimed subrogation interest. Consider the following hypothetical: 
Hypothetical 17—Insured Acts in Good Faith but Fails to 
Prove the Full Subrogation Interest 
A is injured in a car accident with B. Health insurer XYZ 
pays $20,000 in medical bills for plaintiff between the time 
of the incident and the time A’s and B’s dispute goes to 
trial. A introduces only $15,000 in medical expenses at the 
tort trial because A cannot find expert support linking the 
other $5,000 in bills to the negligence of B. XYZ, which 
has notice of the trial, does not attempt to prove the 
additional $5,000 in medical bills. A obtains a collectable 
judgment against B that includes an award of $15,000 in 
medical bills. Post-trial, XYZ asserts a gross subrogation 
interest for the entire $20,000. A will object, and the trial 
judge will decide whether XYZ is entitled to recovery of 
the extra monies. Under these facts, the trial judge should 
limit the gross subrogation award to $15,000 because A 
exercised good faith in attempting to prove the medical 
bills, could not do so, and XYZ elected not to prove the 
bills itself. 
Note that the key consideration in Hypothetical 17 is the finding 
that A exercised good faith in proving the medical bills in the case. 
Ordinarily, plaintiffs who bear the burden of proving damages that are 
subject to a subrogation interest should be required to exercise good faith in 
getting evidence of those damages admitted and in seeking their recovery. 
                                                                                                                 
only. In any case, the distinction may be merely academic; indeed, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court treats rights to subrogation and reimbursement identically in the context of the current 
made-whole rule, and so there seems little reason to now make a complicated distinction 
under the Proposal. See supra notes 47–50 & accompanying text. 
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However, situations readily arise where a plaintiff, while still 
exercising good faith, might choose not to introduce evidence of certain 
damages—namely, where the cost of proving the reasonableness and 
necessity of those damages does not make economic sense.128 In these 
situations, if the subrogee does not introduce the evidence itself, the 
subrogation interest should be reduced by the amount reasonably left 
unproven. In any event, it would be prudent for insured’s counsel and the 
subrogee to discuss such matters before the tort trial and reach an 
agreement on this dilemma. If they do not or cannot, a trial judge can 
resolve it after the trial. 
Conversely, consider this hypothetical: 
Hypothetical 18—Insured Strategically Elects Not to Prove 
Some or All of the Subrogation Interest 
A is injured in a motor vehicle wreck with B. A’s health 
insurance company pays $40,000 in medical bills. A 
decides not to introduce evidence of those bills at trial 
because A does not want the small amount of medical bills 
to have an adverse anchor effect on the jury’s potential 
total damage award. The subrogee does not oppose this 
litigation strategy and does not prove the amount of the 
medical expenses. The jury awards $100,000 in damages, 
allocating none of it for medical expenses. The judgment is 
collected. Absent an agreement to the contrary, the 
subrogee is entitled to a gross subrogation award of 
$40,000 even though the jury awarded no money for 
medical expenses because A elected not to prove the 
medical expenses. 
The result in Hypothetical 18 is fair because the subrogee should 
not suffer from A’s decision not to prove medical expenses or its decision 
not to interfere with A’s litigation strategy.129 The result would be different 
if A advised the subrogee sufficiently in advance of trial that it intended to 
make no effort to prove the medical bills and it was the responsibility of the 
subrogee to do so. In such a case, the subrogee’s failure to gather evidence 
necessary to prove the medical expenses and present that evidence at trial 
                                                 
 128. For example, taking an out-of-state medical deposition at a cost of $3,500 to prove 
a $5,000 medical bill is not an economically prudent decision. 
 129. Nonetheless, it would be prudent for the subrogee to advise the insured in writing 
before the trial that its agreement not to interfere with insured’s trial strategy should not be 
deemed a waiver of its right to seek subrogation for the full amount of the monies it paid on 
insured’s behalf. 
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would result in no award for those expenses and consequently the loss of 
the subrogation claim.130 
Finally, the hearing on subrogation issues should be held after the 
trial but before a final judgment is issued. This framework permits a prompt 
resolution of the subrogation interest and, in the event an appeal is required 
on any issue in the tort case or the subrogation hearing, ensures that all 
issues go to the court of appeals at one time on one record. 
D. Settlement with One of Multiple Tortfeasors 
The decision of an insured to settle with one of multiple tortfeasors 
is a complicated decision that is extremely fact dependent. The existence of 
a subrogation interest further complicates the analysis. While a 
comprehensive discussion about all the factors that go into such an analysis 
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is appropriate to make several relevant 
points. 
First, a decision to embark upon settlement discussions with one of 
several tortfeasors furthers the goals of encouraging communication with 
the subrogee, obtaining the subrogee’s approval of any settlement, and 
reaching an agreement with the subrogee as to how the settlement proceeds 
should be handled. Because any settling defendant will insist upon being 
protected from subsequent claims by the subrogee, a tort defendant will 
ordinarily require that settlement monies representing the claimed 
subrogation interest or the entire amount of the settlement—whichever is 
less—be held in trust or be deposited with the court pending the resolution 
of the subrogation claim. Thus, if the insured’s reason for settling with one 
defendant is that the insured needs money immediately, a settlement for less 
than the subrogation interest will do the insured little good. However, an 
insured may seek court permission to withdraw some portion of the money 
held in trust or in court from a settlement with one of several tortfeasors if 
the subrogee is given notice of a hearing and the opportunity to be heard. 
The court should consider all relevant factors in deciding whether to grant 
an interim distribution of any portion of the monies set aside for satisfaction 
of the subrogation interest. 
Second, it may be in the subrogee’s best interest to approve a 
partial settlement and accept some amount of the funds, and then agree to 
                                                 
 130. This scenario would rarely arise in the real world. The insured’s lawyer has every 
incentive to present medical proof, including medical bills, except in those cases where a 
professional judgment is made that introducing the bills might decrease the value of the case. 
However, one can imagine a situation in which the subrogee intervenes, irritates insured’s 
counsel and interferes with the pre-trial proceedings, to where plaintiff’s counsel refuses to 
do the extra work necessary to prove the medical expenses. A decision not to assemble the 
proof necessary to get the medical expenses admitted into evidence should be communicated 
to the subrogee so that it has a reasonable period of time to prove the medical bills. 
Likewise, a decision by plaintiff’s counsel to shift that work to subrogee’s counsel will have 
an impact on a future reduction of the subrogation interest for recovery acquisition expense. 
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either a formula for handling any future settlements, or agree to disagree on 
all other issues pending resolution of the entire case. How this plays out in 
practice is limited only by the facts, the imaginations of the lawyers, and 
the flexibility of the parties. 
Third, a judge should not hold a hearing to determine the 
subrogation issues or the reasonableness of any settlement until the 
underlying tort case is fully resolved by judgment or settlement. There 
should only be one such hearing; any more would be inefficient and would 
present more opportunities for inconsistency. That said, the Proposal 
applies equally in the case of a settlement with one of several tortfeasors 
and in cases involving a single tortfeasor. 
CONCLUSION 
The Modified Made-Whole Doctrine Proposal is aimed at 
achieving the fairest result for all parties when determining a tort 
subrogation interest by taking into account such fundamental factors as 
comparative fault, collectability of damages, and recovery acquisition costs. 
At its core, the Proposal is based on the idea that a subrogee should not be 
entitled to recover from its insured monies that the insured did not recover 
from a tortfeasor. After all, a subrogee by definition has only the right to 
stand in the shoes of its insured; nothing more, nothing less. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court is to be commended for applying the 
law of subrogation and the made-whole doctrine in a manner consistent 
with the notions of equity underpinning both subjects. It is the hope of the 
author that this Article will help the Bench and Bar resolve future 
substantive subrogation issues in a manner consistent with equity and 
provide procedural guidance for the efficient resolution of subrogation 
interests. 
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